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KEYNOTE SPEAKERS
In Free Choice (FC) inferences, conjunctive meanings are derived from disjunctive sentences contrary to the prescriptions of classical logic (Kamp 1973, Zimmermann 2000):

(1) Deontic FC
You may go to the beach or to the cinema. \( \sim \) You may go to the beach and you may go to the cinema.

(2) Epistemic FC
Mr. X might be in Victoria or in Brixton. \( \sim \) Mr. X might be in Victoria and he might be in Brixton.

In the talk I will present a formal account of FC inferences in a Bilateral State-based Modal Logic (BSML) (Aloni 2022). The novel hypothesis at the core of this proposal is that FC and related inferences are a straightforward consequence of a tendency in human cognition to neglect models that verify sentences by virtue of some empty configurations (neglect-zero). After defining the model theory and discussing some of the applications, I will compare BSML with related systems (truthmaker semantics, inquisitive semantics and possibility semantics) via translations into Modal Information Logic (van Benthem 2019).
Most contemporary work on the semantics and pragmatics of slurring terms takes as paramount linguistic data of slur-containing asserted declaratives. Theorists have primarily focused on accounting for intuitions about truth of asserted content as well as the projective behavior of slurs. In this vein, philosophers have examined slurs as they occur under negation, in conditionals, and in modals; they have explored how slurs embed in attitude attributions; and have investigated the variable offense profile of slurs when used, mentioned, explicitly quoted, and employed in free indirect discourse. Some have also reached beyond assertions of declaratives to investigate speech acts involving slurs in imperative and interrogative constructions.

One of the primary techniques theorists have used for exploring slurs’ mode of derogating is by analyzing how they differ from their neutral counterparts. Among the reigning views are Semantic Descriptivism (Hom, Hom & May, Bach); Semantic Expressivism (Saka, Richard, Jeshion); Semantic Perspectivalism (Camp); Prototype Semantics (Croom, Neufeld), Directive Semantics (Kirk-Giannini), Inferentialism (Tirrell), Pure Pragmatic Affiliationalism (Nunberg, Bollinger); Prohibitionism (Anderson & Lepore). The plethora of theories has borne fruit. Yet because of the near exclusive focus of slurs in declaratives, imperatives, and interrogatives, theorists have presumed, sometimes only implicitly, that slurs and their neutral counterparts are syntactically equivalent, differing only in their semantics, pragmatics, or sociolinguistic properties. That is, they at least implicitly assume that in every grammatical construction C containing a slur s, replacement of s within C with its neutral counterpart nc, C(s/nc), will also be a grammatical construction. This assumption, I will argue, is false. There is a host of important syntactic data that differentiates slurs from neutral counterparts, and may help reveal how best to explain slurs’ capacities to derogate. This data resides in vocatives.

In this paper, I have two main goals. One is to discern the syntactic data distinguishing slurs from neutral counterparts within vocatives. The other is to argue that an expressivist semantics can naturally account for many of these special syntactic properties, and that the syntactic properties
may well underwrite that semantics. The argument I offer is developed from the following key idea: We can retain syntactic parallelism of neutral counterparts and slurs within vocatives by supplementing them with negative contemptuous affect. Although I do not deny that alternative accounts of slurs can explain these striking syntactic facts, I believe the data from vocatives offers some syntactic support for an expressivist semantics.
This talk will introduce and study logical systems in which formulas represent "effects" (e.g. of argumentation), such that these "effects" correspond formally to vectors. In a slogan: content is a vector. The logics involve deductive systems, semantics with appropriate notions of logical consequence, and extensions to similarity, inductive logic, and belief revision. The resulting systems may be interpreted in probabilistic terms, and they can be applied to logically reconstruct and address some well-known topics and problems from philosophy, cognitive psychology, computational linguistics, and machine learning.
Kripke’s notion of de jure rigidity, I argue, is only derivatively a property of linguistic objects, only derivatively tied to a notion of semantic reference. That may seem an odd thing to say given that Kripke explicitly introduces rigidity in ‘Naming and Necessity’ as a property of certain linguistic objects (on fixed readings), ordinary proper names but also indexical and demonstrative pronouns. However, if we focus on Kripke’s “brief restatement of the idea of rigid designation, and the intuition about names that underlies it” (1980: 6) in his ‘Preface’ and his brief remarks about de jure rigidity in its final footnote (1980: 21 n. 21), we can discern a route to an understanding of de jure rigidity that makes it a deeper and more explanatory notion than it first seems, one that finesse any appeal to stipulation, fiat, normativity, or direct reference. And the precise route becomes clear once we set an explanatory account of speaker reference against the background of (i) very general facts about the nature of intentions and other mental states with propositional contents and (ii) the cognitive resources needed for regularly engaging with the three-dimensional continuants (space-occupying particulars) that populate our dynamic and contingent world. Speaker reference, in the required sense, is not Kripke’s notion of speaker’s reference – note the possessive. Kripke appeals directly to a notion of semantic reference (linguistic reference, expression reference) in defining his notion of speaker’s reference. But the notion of speaker reference we need is a truly Gricean one that reverses the order of explanation. Just as there can be cases of speaker meaning that do not involve linguistic meaning, so there can be cases of speaker reference that do not involve semantic reference. And just as speaker meaning figures in an explanatory account of linguistic meaning, so speaker reference figures in an explanatory account of semantic reference. Indeed, speaker reference is, as Schiffer has suggested, just object-dependent speaker meaning, which is to say that whenever the content of what a speaker means by uttering something on a given occasion is an object-dependent proposition, we have a case of speaker reference. Semantic reference, on the account I propose, is just speaker reference seen through the lens of lexical constraints and semantic composition, which is to say that the semantic reference of an
expression e (on a given occasion of utterance) is never something distinct from what the speaker is referring to with e (on that occasion of utterance). No freestanding notion of semantic reference is needed for the purposes of a theory of semantic composition capable of playing an explanatory role in a theory of linguistic communication. More pointedly: there is nothing of empirical significance for a freestanding theory of semantic reference to be about and no need for a semantic theory to explicitly invoke a notion of rigidity. The de jure rigidity of genuine referring expressions (whether phonic or aphonic) derives from the rigidity inherent in speaker reference, which itself derives from the rigidity inherent in object-dependent representational states. This leaves it wide open whether the semantic reference of a genuine referring expression (on a given occasion of utterance) exhausts its impact on the truth conditions of the proposition a sentence containing it expresses (on that occasion).
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It has been argued that in utterances like George Wallace is a Napoleon the name Napoleon is used metaphorically, and is therefore beyond the scope of a semantic account of proper names (cf. Kripke 1971: 149; Burge 1973: 429). I will call this approach the metaphor thesis. In this paper, I argue that while such uses are indeed “special”, they differ from metaphors in crucial respects. I claim that coercion of proper names (PNs) into predicates denoting properties allegedly satisfied by their bearers (henceforth nonliteral predicates) must result from the presence of a meaning-shifting operator in the syntax, rather than a post-syntactic metaphorical reinterpretation. I provide a semantics for the operator and discuss several ways to describe its licensing conditions.

The argument in favor of syntactically licensed coercion proceeds as follows. First, I show that when it comes to PNs, the availability of a nonliteral interpretation is determined not only by context, but also by the syntactic configuration of the PN. That such restrictions do not apply to common metaphors renders the metaphor thesis untenable. I then apply a classic ambiguity diagnostic – i.e. the ability/disability of an expression’s meaning to vary under ellipsis (Zwicky and Sadock 1975) – to show that PNs are ambiguous between a (fixed) literal meaning and a (context dependent) nonliteral one. Common metaphors do not pattern like PNs with respect to this diagnostic.

This argument alone does not justify coercion in the syntax as PNs might be lexically ambiguous, with the literal and nonliteral meanings contributed by phonologically identical yet semantically distinct lexical entries. To discern between the syntactic and the lexical approach, I provide data illustrating that nonliteral PNs in ellipsis constructions can have both strict and sloppy readings. For instance, the example below can be used felicitously to express the speaker’s admiration for Obama and contempt for Nixon (∆ indicates elided material).

If Obama hadn’t been Obama, I wouldn’t have liked him all that much, but if Nixon hadn’t ∆, I would have probably liked him better.
What seems to be elided above is the constituent hadn’t been Nixon. However, given basic assumptions about ellipsis often made in the generative linguistic tradition (the parallelism requirement), the lexical approach cannot account for this reading. On the syntactic approach I propose, a nonliteral PN is syntactically decomposed into a silent coercion operator and a literal PN, which is the operator’s input. This approach can account for the example above by assuming that what is elided is a derived predicate in which the operator takes a bound variable as its argument.

The paper concludes by showing that the operator’s licensing conditions make reference to two notions of triviality – logical and contextual. While the operator is only licensed when its presence renders an otherwise trivial utterance nontrivial, contextual triviality alone does not suffice. Rather, further syntactic conditions must be satisfied for the operator to be licensed in otherwise contextually trivial utterances. Thus, if successful, the argument sheds light on yet another role trivialities play in natural language.

References


In his articles on radical interpretation, Donald Davidson presents the principle of charity as constitutive to radical interpretation. According to the principle, anyone who wants to make sense of what a speaker is saying has to presuppose that the speaker is reasonable and what she is saying is true. That is the condition under which the speaker can be understood. The key requirements for exercising charity are rationality, truth, and belief. The interpreter or audience attributes these desiderata to the speaker and is then able to work out the meaning of the speaker’s words. Attributing these desiderata to the speaker makes Davidson’s account of charity deliberative. I make two observations about his account: 1) It is over-intellectualistic, that is, it uses high epistemological and metaphysical vocabulary (rationality, belief, truth) giving the impression that charity or radical interpretation can only be carried out by people with sophisticated thinking capacities. Yet we do seem to have normal conversations with children who have not developed such high epistemological capabilities, as well as with people whose mental capacities are impaired, like persons with autism. The account does not capture how charity works in their case. 2) Davidson’s account of the principle of charity, by its use of words like ”presuppose,” ”hypothesise,” deals with a deliberative and rather slow process of understanding. But recent studies in the cognitive sciences and empirical psychology suggest that there is also a fast way of understanding others. It seems that the insight from such studies could throw some light on how charity can be exercised in faster contexts than we have in the literature. This might be corroborated by studies in low-level processes like seeing, hearing, etc, which have been carried out alongside highly epistemic concepts like rationality, etc. I argue, therefore, that Davidson’s account of charity is deliberative, and needs a corollary account, one that can capture more naturalist and automatic capacities for understanding a speaker.

First, I will present Davidson’s account of the principle of charity and argue that it is deliberative and fails to capture our more naturalist and automatic tendencies. Then I will turn to the cognitive sciences and present how beliefs are fixed and comprehension attained according to Daniel Gilbert.
His argument that it is easier to believe than not to believe - which may provide a leeway towards an automatic model of comprehension - will be presented. That will be followed by a review of timing of comprehension processes in neuroscience, which again demonstrate that there is some level of automaticity to our understanding capacities. Yet, even if we assume that there is such automaticity, how is such automaticity to be adumbrated philosophically? Here, some psychological theories of automaticity will be examined and philosophical expression of them made. But given that charity is deliberate, how might automatic processes fit into it? This will also be examined. Thus, the conditions for automaticity and charity will be outlined. In the end, it will be shown that an automatic charity is needed in addition to Davidson’s deliberative one, and only then would the principle of charity be complete.

References


Our paper employs theoretical and empirical methods to examine concept individuation in the context of the debate between what Fodor calls ‘Concept Pragmatism’ and ‘Concept Cartesianism’ (Fodor 2004). We focus on Fodor’s argument that co-extensive concepts pose a difficulty for pragmatic views that individuate concepts by epistemic capacities (sorting, inferring, etc.).

Briefly, Fodor argues that we cannot use sorting abilities to distinguish between necessary co-extensional concepts, such as TRIANGLE and (CLOSED) TRILATERAL, or WATER and H2O. While the concept pairs pick out the same instances, the psychological mechanisms that mediate the processes are presumably different. “Sorting triangles requires thinking about angles, sorting trilaterals requires thinking about sides” (Fodor 2005, 25).

We do not doubt that, when sorting co-extensional concepts, we focus on different aspects of the targets. We propose, however, that Fodor’s sharp distinction between sorting and representing rests on an overly simplistic notion of sorting as the capacity to perform binary classification decisions. Sorting, however, is a richer and more nuanced capacity, which goes beyond the execution of binary decisions with respect to single, isolated categories. Rather, it involves the application of a complex conceptual taxonomy (Rosch et al., 1976).

Within a given inclusive category (e.g., BIRD), there are several categories at the same level of abstraction (e.g., ROBIN, SPARROW, etc.), forming a “contrast set”. Importantly, the conceptual taxonomy is closely tied to the way in which concepts are represented: features that are diagnostic—that is, that successfully distinguish members of a given category from members of other categories in the set—are more central to categorization than non-diagnostic features (Rosch and Mervis 1975). Moreover, such features hold a task-independent, privileged status in a concept’s representation.
Sorting and Representing: Dismantling the Concept-Pragmatism / Concept-Cartesianism Dichotomy

(Cree et al., 2006; Hsu et al., 2014). Thus, there is a tight connection between the structure of our taxonomy and the features that figure in category representations.

We hypothesized that co-extensive concepts are situated within different contrast sets in the taxonomy. To test this hypothesis, we assigned subjects with terms that were pulled randomly from lists of co-extensive concepts. Each subject received only one concept from each co-extensive pair (e.g., WATER or H2O). Subjects then performed a contrast category generation task (Malt and Johnson 1992; Markman and Wisniewski 1997). We show that people place co-extensive concepts within different contrast sets (e.g., H2O is often placed under the broader category of CHEMICAL, while WATER is often placed under BEVERAGE). Contra Fodor, sorting—when properly conceived as an application of conceptual taxonomy rather than a binary decision with respect to a single isolated concept—can differentiate between co-extensive concepts.

Rather than vindicating a version of ‘bare bones Concept Pragmatism’, we maintain that our data shows that Fodor’s dichotomy between Pragmatism and Cartesianism is problematic: ‘ways of sorting’ cannot be considered in isolation from the associated taxonomic structure. We further discuss the implication of this view of concept individuation to the distinction between concepts and context.

References


In the philosophical literature regarding tenses and indexicality very little attention has been paid to temporal prefixes such as the ones present in the following sentences:

1. Obama is an ex-president of the USA.

2. Participants of the Paris Peace Conference should have been afraid of post-war German desire for revenge.

3. Due to the absence of sources presocratic philosophy remains largely unknown today.

The fact might be a bit surprising as – to the extent that philosophers should be interested in possible language forms – the possibility of languages that, instead of tenses or adverbs of time, might use temporal prefixes is an interesting general philosophical issue (cf. Jespersen (1924)).

The aim of this talk is to make a step in the direction of filling that gap by pointing at theoretical challenges that arise when temporal prefixes are the subject of an analysis. The theory that treats some temporal phrases with temporal prefixes as contextuals (in the Nunberg-Vallée sense) is presented in the paper.

References


The crucial problem in ontology building in the informatics context is the identification of main ontological categories and the determination of the logical type of the respective category, whether it is an individual, a relationship, an attribute, etc. In this presentation I will introduce a specific approach based on natural language on how to identify basic categories and how to assign them the respective logical type. The logic for conceptual analysis and specification is Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) with its procedural semantics which is particularly apt for a fine-grained analysis in which all the semantically salient features of natural language can be plausibly formalized. My approach for the determination of the ontological category of concept is the differentiation between the static and dynamic part of the respective domain of interest based on the function of terms. The linguistic word class of the respective term is also taken into account. The static part of the domain is made up of simple and non-decomposable unique object and their characteristics and the dynamic part is made up of activities which formed events.

I distinguish between simple, non-decomposable unique objects, which at the level of logical types correspond exactly to individuals of the given domain. These objects can have their characteristics. In the conceptual analysis, it is useful to distinguish between two important types of object characterization. Let us compare the following two questions about object characteristics: ”What is this X?” (possible answer: ”This X is an apple”) and ”What does this X taste like?” (possible answer: ”This X is sour”). In the first case, we ask about the property of the object that will belong to it until the object ceases to exist. Let us call these properties substantive properties. These properties in ontology usually form so-called ISA relationships (“Every apple is a fruit”) and form a stable part of domain ontology. These substantive properties usually also carry the appropriate attributes that belong to the objects bearing the respective property. For example, if X is an apple, then it has attributes such as color, taste, etc., depending on the needs of the particular case study. These characteristics can usually change over time (for
example, a sour apple may become sweet), even though not necessarily. These characteristics are accidental in the sense that their particular value does not affect substantive properties. Let us call these characteristics accidental. From a logical point of view, they are always values of the respective attributes: for example, an entity which is an apple has the attributes ”color” (values: red, green, etc.), ”taste” (values: sweet, sour, etc.), “weight” (values: 10, dkg, 15 dkg, etc.), and so on.

The dynamic part of the system is made up of activities which form events. The starting point of the conceptual analysis of events is the fact that each event can be specified by a special verb (what is to be done). This type of verb is called an episodic verb according to Tichý’s distinction between episodic and attributive verbs. Thus it seems to be appropriate to make use of the results of linguistic analysis of verbs, to wit of the theory of verb-valency frames. According to this theory, each verb is inherently connected with the so-called participants. They are parameters of an activity denoted by the verb, like the agent/actor of the process (who), the objects that the activity operates on, the resources of the activity, etc. Thus verb-valency frames roughly correspond to senses of verbs, and by their exploitation, we can obtain a fine-grained specification of an activity which forms events.
There is a great deal of similarities between the philosophy of Prior and Tichý. They shared similar approaches to propositions and both preferred intensional logic. One of the resemblances in their logic and philosophy is also their similar approach to definite descriptions, i.e. Tichý’s concept of individual offices and Prior’s concept of the weak and strong ‘the’. The aim of our presentation is to provide a comparison and point out similarities and differences. The differences stem in particular from their different approaches to intensions and modalities. This was caused by the fact that they designed their systems to pursue different goals which will also be introduced in our presentation. At the end of our presentation, we will present integration of certain features of Prior’s theory to Tichý’s system of logic.

One of Pavel Tichý’s celebrated observations was that definite descriptions do not denote individuals, but individual offices, i.e. intensions, the output of which is at most one individual with respect to respective possible worlds and times. For instance, in the proposition:

1. ‘The president of the Czech Republic does not like journalists.’

the description ‘the president of the Czech Republic’ does not refer to the current president of the Czech Republic (who is Miloš Zeman), but to the individual office ‘the president of the Czech Republic’. The holder of the individual office could be at most one individual. However, it could be the case that an individual office is not occupied at the moment e.g. ‘The margrave of Moravia’.

An individual is a holder of an individual office if it fulfils all the requisites of the office. Requisites are the essential properties of the individual office. For instance, one of the requisites for the individual office ‘the president of the Czech Republic’, is to be the citizen of the Czech Republic.
Unlike Tichý, Prior did not develop a systematic theory of individuals. He instead pointed out several problems that contain the ontology of his temporal logic and listed possible suggestions as to how to solve them. One of these suggestions approximates Tichý’s individual offices. Prior in his book Time and Modality specifically proposed a differentiation between a strong and weak understanding of the article ‘the’.

The strong ‘the’ appears in definite descriptions in which the reference is always the same regardless of the time, i.e. ‘The first president of the Czech Republic is a screenwriter’. In contrast, the reference of the descriptions that contain the weak ‘the’ differs in time. Proposition 1 contains, for example, the weak ‘the’. The truth-value of it could change over time. In contrast to Tichý, the denotation of the definite descriptions (both the strong and weak ‘the’) in Prior’s theory is always a concrete individual.
Multipropositionalism (MP) is the view that sentences can semantically express more than one proposition (relative to a context of utterance). This phenomenon is identified as different from those cases in which in addition to a proposition semantically expressed by a sentence there are others that are pragmatically communicated, or implicated, or presupposed. In some cases the view is a consequence of certain treatment of expressions that have or can have a multiplicity of meanings. The result is that sentences containing these terms or expressions would compositionally yield multiple contents.

The polyreferential view was introduced as a novel semantics for proper names according to which names can have more than one semantic referent, indeed as many as bearers of the name there are. This view emerged partly as a response to the problem of multiple bearerhood, and it accounts for this problem in a way that preserves the referentialist’s contention that proper names are fundamentally referential terms.

Polyreference as I developed it entails that sentences containing names would have multiple semantic contents, or that they would semantically express multiple propositions.

The idea that a sentence can express more than one proposition or have more than one content follows from one way of cashing out the fact that words can have multiple meanings. On the naïve model I propose, if a word $w$ has two meanings, and the content of a sentence results compositionally from the meanings of their parts (and way of combination), then a sentence containing $w$ would have two contents as well, one corresponding to each of the meanings of $w$.

This may strike some as a weird application of MP. MP may be attractive or even intuitive when dealing with cases where it is not clear how to get unique contents (or whether it is desirable get unique contents). But the case of proper names is not like that; we rather have the intuition that we normally refer to one individual at the time, or that our sentences express just one proposition. This intuition has a place in my theory as as I will show. However, there are cases in which a speaker may want to communicate more than one content, or would exploit the fact that sentences or words
have more than one meaning, perhaps to make a joke, to mislead, use a metaphor, or being purposely vague or sloppy, etc. Cases like this with names are probably very unusual, but not impossible, as I will discuss. So it is nice feature of the theory that it allows for this. Similar cases of meaning more than one thing are much more frequent with polysemous words or perhaps vague terms, or certain context-sensitive ones. I would suggest that the naïve model of MP proposed for polyreference would nicely account for these other phenomena as well.
Since inferentialism has been established by Brandom (1994, 2000), the doctrine has gained many supporters as well as many critics. One of the main objections to inferentialism, formulated by Fodor and Lepore (2001, 2007), concerns the question of which inferences are supposed to be meaning-constitutive. According to inferentialism, the meaning of an expression is determined by its use in inferences. However, so the objection goes, each expression can be used in a large number of (sentences and so) inferences, hence, it is problematic to see how all the inferences could be meaning-constitutive. To be precise, according to Fodor and Lepore, inferentialism fails to give a sufficiently clear criterion for distinguishing between meaning-constitutive and "utterly contingent inferences" (Fodor and Lepore 2007, 680).

One of Fodor’s and Lepore’s reasons why inferentialism should provide such a criterion lies in their observance of the idea that the meanings of expressions must be shared by the members of a linguistic community because the successfulness of communication depends crucially on the fact that speakers and hearers employ the shared meanings in the process of linguistic understanding of expressions/sentences.

The main aim of this talk is to show that inferentialism can provide an explanation of the successfulness of communication and linguistic understanding that does not rely on the notion of shared meanings. In particular, my aim is to argue that, assuming the view of communication as a coordination of action, the inferentialist framework is able to provide an explanation of the successfulness of communication and linguistic understanding in terms of partial sharing of meanings. If this is so, then inferentialism can avoid the objection by showing that Fodor’s and Lepore’s demand for the criterion of meaning-constitutiveness is unsubstantiated.

References


The notion of indexicality tends to bring to mind a set of indexical expressions - words with a special semantics that allows them to refer to various entities based on rules that tie their denotations to specific features of a context. On the classical view, these special properties of indexical items are inherent to their meaning and the debate mostly concerns the exact set of lexical items which can be claimed to possess such properties.

Contrary to such a view, there are ideas suggesting that indexicality could be more effectively modeled based on inputs from the syntax-context interface, rather than just semantics. Such theories tend to hypothesise and argue that there is a place in the structure of a sentence - most probably in the left periphery of the C-layer (Giorgi, 2010, 2012) - where contextual coordinates for speaker, time, and location can be encoded via primarily syntactic mechanisms (Shklovsky and Sudo, 2014). In this system, the role of the primary input from context to syntax is achieved by the tense feature on verbs, which in many languages is a morphological requirement. Interestingly, since all verbs require some kind of tense component, and all tense features carry contextual information, it can be reasoned that all verbs are to some extent indexical. And yet, in sentences with embedded verbal clauses, the syntactic relations determine which contextual information will ultimately be encoded. This interpretation suggests that - at least in some cases - reference-fixing for indexicals is dependent not only on their inherent semantics but also on the structural relations that obtain between lexical items of a specific kind within a given sentence. While in simple cases this distinction might seem at best forced, at worst disruptive, I argue that it may shed light on instances of embedding where the reference of an indexical item appears to behave differently than would be predicted by the traditional account. In the literature, this phenomenon is called indexical shift and the debate is still ongoing whether it does or does not actually exist in natural language.

In my presentation, I want to explore the possibility that indexical shift could occur in natural language, but that it requires a special interaction between the indexical information encoded in the syntax and the indexical information encoded by the semantics of lexical items considered to be
indexicals. The monster operators famously banned from natural language by David Kaplan (1979) are not so much operators understood as specific items that would systematically cause indexical shift wherever they appear. Rather, they would be modeled as a special interaction between the structure of embedding and tense features that can sometimes deliver contextual information to the syntax in a way that allows this information to override the contextual information from embedded indexical items at the stage of computing semantic value. Hints of such a consideration, though modeled purely semantically, are also present in Santorio (2010, 2012).

References


The classical definition of lying maintains that one lies only if one says something one believes to be false with an intention to deceive (Isenberg 1964; Lackey 2013). Recently, there is an influential trend to modify this definition in two ways. Firstly, lies are not just any sayings, rather lying is restricted to assertions. Secondly, the intention to deceive is considered unnecessary. Thus, we are left with the following simple definition: lying is asserting insincerely (Carson 2006; Sorensen 2007; Stokke 2018; Viebahn 2020, 2021). Hence, we can extract two almost universally held assumptions:

**ASSERTION-ONLY** Only assertions can be lies.

**NO-INTENTION** An intention to deceive is unnecessary for lying.

We can observe a further assumption that is rarely expressed directly but it follows from some recent accounts of lying:

**INFORMATIVENESS** Lies are considered to be informative speech acts.

This way of thinking is grounded in theories of assertion that take them to be essentially informative speech acts (Searle 1969; Stalnaker 1978; García-Carpintero 2004; Pagin 2011; Farkas 2020). Since lies are assertions, they should also satisfy INFORMATIVENESS. Recently, the case has been made for lying with informative presuppositions (Meibauer 2014; Viebahn 2020, 2021). However, this leaves uninformative presuppositions, the standard and default type, unanalysed.

I show that uninformative cases of presuppositions are suitable vehicles for lying. As a result, lying in general is not restricted to informative speech acts, and hence INFORMATIVENESS is wrong. Consider the following case (cf. Viebahn 2020):

Gertrude, Lily and Mick are colleagues of Jack, whose wife has recently given birth to a baby boy. Gertrude and Lily have seen the baby and know it is a boy. They know that Mick hasn’t seen the baby and want to trick him into thinking that Jack’s baby is a girl. Gertrude says to Mick:

(1) Jack’s baby is lovely. Have you seen her yet? Mick comes to believe that Jack’s baby is a girl.
During the conversation, Mick inquires about Jack’s baby and Lily says:

(2) She is very playful.

In (1) and (2) the speakers make a presupposition that they believe is false; while (1) carries an informative presupposition that Jack’s baby is a girl, the presupposition in (2) is uninformative. Cases such as (1) are considered to be lies (Meibauer 2014; Viebahn 2020). What about (2)? We can apply certain widely-held criteria for lying, like the deniability criterion (Stokke 2018; Viebahn 2020, 2021). It states that lies cannot be consistently denied, only misleading statements can. Consider that Lily, just like Gertrude, cannot consistently deny that Jack’s baby is a girl; when accused of lying she cannot say “I didn’t lie, I didn’t claim that Jack’s baby is a girl.”

I will claim that uninformative presuppositions can be just as committal as informative ones (Potts 2015; Peters 2016). If we consider commitment-based definitions of lying, it follows that we can lie with uninformative content. This goes against INFORMATIVENESS and such theories as Viebahn’s (2020; 2021) that take presuppositions that are already in the common ground, like Lily’s, as noncommittal. However, extending Viebahn’s criteria for commitment into informative presuppositions will not do. I will further show there are both believed-false informative and uninformative presuppositions that are committal but are not lies. To account for these cases, I will advocate for reintroducing an intention to deceive into a definition of lying.

References


Linguistic understanding is a central element of our social lives; it contributes to the achievement of communicative success, facilitates action coordination, and enables acquisition of testimonial knowledge. Nevertheless, characterizations of linguistic understanding offered by philosophers of language are very heterogeneous.

We can divide existent philosophical theories of linguistic understanding into two groups: direct and indirect. The distinction is based on the way in which the state of understanding postulated by a given theory represents the content of the linguistic input. According to indirect views, the content of an utterance (p) is represented as being said by a given speaker. When Speaker says that p, Hearer’s understanding has the content: r = that Speaker said that p. According to direct views, the content of a state of understanding is just the content of the utterance, i.e., p. Theories within both groups are further differentiated based on the type of mental attitude identified with linguistic understanding. Thus, indirect views include the knowledge view (e.g., Evans, 1982), the linguistic seeming view (Fricker, 2003), and the indirect belief view (Balcerak Jackson, 2019), while direct views include the content-entertaining view (Longworth, 2018), and the direct belief view (Millikan, 2005).

I start by focusing on direct views. The crucial difference between them concerns the relationship between comprehension and acceptance. According to the direct belief view, we automatically believe everything we comprehend; acceptance is a default position towards comprehended content, while rejection is an effortful activity that requires time and cognitive resources. This claim is rejected by the content-entertaining view. Appealing to the empirical literature on language comprehension, I argue that neither of these accounts is fully accurate. We automatically accept all and only contents which pass the gatekeeper of validation, i.e., a mechanism of monitoring incoming information both for internal consistency and consistency with comprehender’s knowledge. Furthermore, the way in which the mechanism operates requires us to postulate (following the discourse comprehension
literature) two types of interdependent, direct representations: propositional textbase and situation model.

Secondly, I argue that, at the same time, some sort of indirect representation has to be a part of linguistic understanding if we want to explain the mechanism of vigilance towards the source. Based on these considerations, I postulate a dual-stream model of comprehension which involves a complex representational structure of linguistic understanding. The faster, direct stream generates propositional textbase representations and immediately updates them into the situation model upon passing the gatekeeper of validation. The slower, indirect stream generates indirect representations of content as coming from a given source and updates them into the situation model upon passing the gatekeeper of vigilance towards the source.

References


Our paper contributes to the discussion on the relation between compositional and lexical semantics (e.g. Winter 2001). We propose that scope readings of certain multi-quantifier sentences are chosen according to the meanings of the prepositions involved. This claim allows us to account for some previously unexplained scope phenomena such as the frozen scope puzzle. The example in (1) permits both the surface and the inverse scope order:

(1) Mary draped a sheet over every table.

Sentence (1) can be understood to mean that there is a different sheet draped over every table (inverse reading: every table > a sheet), it can be also understood to mean that there is one sheet draped over all the tables (surface reading: a sheet > every table). In the example in (2), however, scope is fixed to the surface order:

(2) Mary draped a table with every sheet.

Sentence (2) exhibits the so-called frozen scope, i.e., only surface reading is possible (a table > every sheet) and the inverse reading is disallowed (♯ every sheet > a table). Two main accounts of the observed scope asymmetry have been proposed. One account argues that (1) and (2) are two distinct constructions with different syntax and semantics: frozen scope is due to an extra layer of non-overt structure (Marantz 1993; Bruening 2001). We follow an alternative account (Pesetsky 1996; Harley 2002), where (1) and (2) have parallel surface structures, and the semantic distinctions between the two structures are caused by the differences in the contributions made by the two different prepositions involved: the locative preposition over in the ambiguous example (1) and the instrumental preposition with in the frozen variant (2). One open question for the latter account is why locative prepositions can invert scope. In this paper, we address this question and propose
that locative prepositions induce dependencies reversing the ordering of the quantifiers involved. This is due to the fact that locative prepositions imply ‘disjointness’ (entities do not occur at more than one place simultaneously), and hence can be interpreted as partial functions (from any type of physical objects to any type of locations). For example, over can be interpreted as the partial function: \( p : |\text{Sheet}| \rightarrow |\text{Table}| \). Restricting the set of sheets to the sheets draped over tables gives the total function (dependency): \( |S_t| \rightarrow |T| \), the intended meaning being that for any table \( a \in |T| \), we have a set \( |S|_a \) of sheets draped over that table. By quantifying over this dependency, we get the inverse ordering of the quantifiers involved: \( \forall t : T \exists S_{S|t} \). Temporal prepositions also induce inverse scope — this is due to the fact that they also imply ‘disjointness’ (events do not occur at more than one time), and hence can be interpreted as partial functions (from events to times). The reason why inverse readings are blocked with certain prepositions (e.g. with) is that instrumental prepositions are interpreted as mere binary relations (do not imply ‘disjointness’), and hence do not induce dependencies reversing the ordering of the quantifiers involved. We propose to extend this account to the frozen scope effects observed in double object constructions:

(3) Someone gave a student every book.

In the example in (3) scope is fixed to the surface order (a student > every book). We follow Harley (2002) in assuming that double object constructions involve a null preposition encoding possession \( P_{HAVE} \): the silent \( P_{HAVE} \) cannot be interpreted as a partial function, and hence does not invert scope.

References


What a speaker ‘says’, as opposed to implicates, is held by contextualists (e.g. Carston 2002, Recanati 2004) to go beyond Grice’s notion of ‘what is said’ (the linguistically encoded meaning of the utterance after reference assignment and disambiguation) to include ‘optionally’ pragmatically recovered meaning. This pragmatically-enhanced what is said is called ‘explicature’.

Borg (2019), Weissman and Terkourafi (2019), and others, argue that the lying-misleading distinction tracks the saying-implicating distinction, and Borg (2019) claims intuitions about whether a speaker has lied generally favour a minimalist over a contextualist notion of saying. I argue for a more indirect method of gauging what hearers entertain as being ‘said’.

Using uncontroversial examples of saying (i.e. cases not involving pragmatic enrichment), presupposing, and implicating, Mazzarella et al (2018) measured reputational costs incurred by speakers who deliberately conveyed falsehoods, finding that, ceteris paribus, people are “significantly more likely to selectively trust the speaker who implicated p than the speaker who [said] or presupposed p”.

I present experimental results using this paradigm to compare contextualist vs. minimalist what is said vs. implicatures. Examples include (1):

1. a. You have time.
   b. You have time to organise a focus group.
   c. A focus group is a good idea.

(1c) implicates the recipient has time to organise a focus group; in (a) this is part of explicature; in (b), it is said in the Gricean/minimalist sense. Participants read a story establishing a high-stakes context, then two testimonies – e.g. (1a), (1c) – then answered a question to gauge their trust in each speaker. In line with contextualism, pragmatically-inferred but explicated material, as in (a), was predicted to be treated as being committed to by the sender to a similar degree as is characteristic of content that is linguistically encoded, or involves only reference assignment, as in (b).
The sender was also predicted to be considered significantly less committed to implicatures. Both predictions were borne out.

Finally, I present a study comparing ‘expansion’ (e.g. (1a)) with ‘completion’ (e.g. (2)):

2. You have enough time.

Saul (2012) argues that the correct notion of saying to capture the lying-misleading distinction includes completions (enrichments necessary to yield a truth-evaluable proposition) but not expansions. This account predicts that speakers will be treated as less committed to contents communicated by expansions than completions; contextualists predict no difference. Our results suggest that the completion-expansion distinction is relevant to lie-judgments. I discuss the implications of these two experiments for the minimalist-contextualist debate about what levels of meaning feature in the comprehension process.

References

5. Saul, Jennifer. 2012. Lying, Misleading and What is Said. OUP.
In this talk, I propose that there are updates to discourse’s rule-governed, linguistic context that are neither semantic nor pragmatic. My central argument for this proposal begins with the following datum.

(1) A woman entered from stage left. Another woman entered from stage right. #The woman was carrying a bouquet of flowers. (Roberts 2002)

The explanation for the infelicity in (1) is that a definite description \( \text{The F} \) presupposes that there is a unique salient \( F \)-thing—and the indefinites in the first two sentences make two women salient; hence, the definite description’s presupposition in the final sentence is violated.

But it is crucial what is meant by “salient” in characterizing the definite description’s presupposition, for witness the felicity of (2).

(2) Sue went to the store and bought a sage plant along with eight others. She loved the sage plant. (Mandelkern & Rothschild 2020)

The presupposition of the definite description in the second sentence of (2) is not violated, since there is felicity. So merely adding information to the discourse entailing the existence of a number of things—in this case, mentioning that Sue bought eight other sage plants—does not make them salient in a way that can interfere with a definite description’s presupposition.

Thus, the infelicity in (1) is not a merely pragmatic phenomenon: it is not that, given the first two sentences of (1), one may infer the existence of multiple women; rather, it is crucial that indefinites are used, whose semantics conventionally initiates two discourse referents for women (Heim 1982).

Consider now the following (Maclaran 1982).

(3) _Context: John and Mary are in an art gallery with a number of paintings in front of them._
   #The painting is beautiful. _Context: John is directing Mary as they are working together rearranging his living room._
   #You will take the chair and I will take the chair.
The definite descriptions in (3) and (3) are infelicitous (even if accompanied by demonstrations). So there are multiple paintings and chairs represented as salient in the interlocutors’ linguistic context—as if they were initiated by indefinites as in (1). Thus, when objects are present in interlocutors’ mutual perceptual environment, they are not represented in the linguistic context in virtue of pragmatic inferences from mutually available information—as in (2). Moreover, it is certainly not the case that they are initiated into context via accommodation, a pragmatic process through which presuppositions may become satisfied: in (3) and (3) the definite descriptions’ presuppositions are violated in virtue of the salient paintings and chairs.

My proposal is thus that discourse referents for objects in interlocutors’ mutual perceptual environment are added to the linguistic context, but not via any pragmatic process nor via any linguistic expression’s semantically encoded update. After working through the central motivation just outlined, I show how this proposal was hit upon in seminal works of Stalnaker (1978) and Heim (1982), but has been underappreciated since. I also show how it provides a fresh solution to two foundational puzzles concerning context-sensitive referential expressions.
There are distinct theories about the origin and degree of contextual dependence of concepts (i.e., nativism vs. empiricism, and invariantism vs. contextualism –respectively–). In my work I examine the relationships existing between those approaches in order to determine which alternatives are compatible.

My starting point will be the two extreme views in each debate. More specifically, I assume that empiricism / nativism and invariantism / contextualism are disjoint pairs of approaches, which cover the whole domains of possible explanations on the origin and context-dependence of concepts, that is:

$$\text{Empiricism} \leftrightarrow \neg \text{Nativism}$$
$$\text{Invariantism} \leftrightarrow \neg \text{Contextualism}$$

Based on this, I will prove that two entailment relations can be identified between the degree of context dependence of concepts and their origin, namely, that invariantism entails nativism (IeN) and that empiricism entails contextualism (EeC). The arguments in favor of these two entailments run as follows:

**ARGUMENT IeN**

[1] Concepts are invariant across individuals and time. (Invariantism)
[2] For each category, the same concept is shared by every individual.
[3] Every individual has different biography and experiences, coming from a variety of contexts and environments.
[4] If [3] is accepted, then it is highly implausible that distinct individuals — who have been exposed to different experiences and environments — could have learned the same concept from such diverse experiences of that category.
[5] The most parsimonious explanation is that individuals share the same concept of a certain category because that concept is identically inherited by them all.
Therefore, all concepts are innate. (Nativism)

**ARGUMENT EeC**

[1’] Concepts are learned from experience. (Empiricism)

[2’] For each category, its associated concept is acquired by individuals on the basis of the biographical experiences they have been exposed to in the past.

[3’] But the biographies of distinct individuals are different, and so will be the experiences they have had about each particular category.

[4’] On the basis of [3’], it is implausible that distinct individuals — with varying experiences and biographies — have acquired the very same concept of a certain category starting from a plurality of experiences — potentially very different.

[5’] The most parsimonious explanation is that concepts are not invariant, but dependent on —at least— the experiential biographies of subjects.

[6’] Therefore, all concepts depend on context. (Contextualism)

Finally, I will also prove that invariantism and empiricism are hardly compatible views; and that the mixture of nativism and contextualism — although it is a theoretically viable possibility — seems to be much less natural than the combinations of invariantism with nativism, and of empiricism with contextualism.
Much attention has been recently devoted in philosophy of language to what can be called “prejudicial language”: especially slurs (derogatory epithets; Jeshion 2013, Nunberg 2018), but also objectionable thick terms (Eklund 2011, Cepollaro and Stojanovic 2016), gendered pejoratives (Ashwell 2016), political code words and dog-whistles (Stanley 2015, Khoo 2017, Saul 2018) and racial generics (Anderson et al. 2012). Prejudicial language in this broad sense can be variously characterized as expressing negative attitudes, causing offense or derogating oppressed or marginalized groups. In this paper, I argue for a distinction between these three aspects: expression, offensiveness and derogation, and discuss how they apply to sub-categories of prejudicial language, what their sources are, and how they relate to considerations of meaning and context, and the semantics/pragmatics distinction.

A useful contrast is provided by expletives such as “damn” or “fuck” (Potts 2007, Hess 2018). They express speaker’s attitudes or emotional states and they may cause offense (as obscenities or impolite expressions). But even expletives that insult someone, like “bastard” or “asshole”, do not derogate them in the same way that slurs etc. do, and they are not, I will argue, offensive in the same way.

Given that dog-whistles, racial generics, and possibly objectionable thick terms may convey it, derogation should be distinguished from expression of negative attitudes or overt offensiveness, and related to the oppressive social hierarchies and ideologies which these expressions rely on and contribute to (Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt 2018). This relation can be construed in presuppositional terms in a common ground model (Garcia-Carpintero 2015): using a prejudicial expression imposes a presupposition of the prejudice on the common ground. The audience may feel forced into complicity with the speaker’s derogatory speech act (Camp 2013). In the case of slurs and racial generics this gives rise to their particular offensiveness, while code words and dog-whistles may avoid being offensive because they communicate their derogatory content covertly. They also lack an expressive component which is arguably present in (most) slurs.
In this way a distinction between expressive, offensive and derogatory meanings can be made. It should be construed in terms of the relations between the (descriptive and/or expressive) semantics of prejudicial language, its “kinematics” (Lewis 1979) wrt common ground and its status as norm-violating. With respect to the latter, two further related aspects should be distinguished: norm-violation through use of taboo language (which slurs share with expletives; Anderson and Lepore 2013) and norm-violation through content (which slurs share with racial generics and possibly code words). This corresponds to a distinction between what is said and the manner in which it is said (Whiting 2013).

Thus, an analysis of expressive, offensive and derogatory meaning engages multiple distinct categories in semantics and pragmatics; they are determined by various configurations of lexical properties and contextual factors, including both conversational and social context. The main upshot is that many issues of current interest, especially wrt slurs, should be reconceptualized in their relation to the semantics/pragmatics interface rather than being considered only on one side of it.

References


Expressive, offensive and derogatory meanings


Western philosophers and ethicists are concerned with establishing consensus in political and social contexts. It is generally believed that reaching consensus leads to a just result. Rawlsian notions of justice emphasize the importance of overlapping consensus for a fair and equitable society. The main problem with Western philosophical thought is the lack of consensus on the very word itself. What exactly is a consensus? What does it mean? How do we know when we have reached a general agreement on certain issues? Most importantly, does achieving a consensus mean that we have found the ethical, moral, and just answer to a particular question? The purpose of this poster is to display the history of consensus as used and defined by Western thinkers. Delineating the many uses of the term and the contextual factors that led to its acceptance is helpful to scholars of law, politics, sociology, economics, and philosophy. Rawls’ conception of justice as fairness and his books, A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, spearheaded the use of consensus in moral, legal, and political philosophy. Pragmatism is especially dependent on the term. Thinkers such as Dewey, Rorty, Putnam, Habermas, Haack, and others frequently discuss the relationship between truth and agreement. Habermas also propounded the consensus theory of truth, stating that truth can be determined by general agreement over its content (he disavowed his position later). The pragmatists are insistent on the need for communicative action and ensuring consensus can be reached in all political and social contexts. A brief overview of the relationship between socially-shared cognition in groups and consensus will also be displayed. The concept of consensus directly impacts varying notions of democracy and social harmony. Understanding the history of the term is important to fully comprehend the development of twentieth century thought as well as the current state of philosophy.
I consider two arguments, which might be used to defend the claims that propositions are fine-grained, and unstructured, respectively. Both arguments rely on IB:

**Independence of belief (IB)** For any distinct propositions P and Q, it is possible to believe P and not believe Q.

I will give reasons to doubt that it is true, and that, even if it is, that it can be used in the arguments.

Argument one:
(1) Conrad is an author.
(2) Korzeniowski is an author.
(3) Adam believes that Conrad is an author.
(4) Adam believes that Korzeniowski is an author.

If (1) and (2) have the same content, and (3) and (4) simply report a relation between Adam and the content of their respective ‘that’-clauses, then (3) and (4) must have the same truth value, i.e., be both true or both false. But, (3) and (4) might have different truth values. A fine-grained theory has a simple explanation: (1) and (2) have different contents. A coarse-grained theory must offer a more complicated explanation, perhaps by complicating the semantics of belief reports, or explaining away the judgement that the reports have different truth values.

The claim that merely distinguishing the contents of (1) and (2) is sufficient to establish that (3) and (4) might differ in truth value relies on IB. So, IB must either be added as a premise of the argument against the coarse-grained theory, or added to the proposed explanation offered by the fine-grained theory.

Argument two:
(5) Conrad wrote Nostromo.
(6) Nostromo was written by Conrad.
(7) Adam believes that Conrad wrote Nostromo.
(8) Adam believes that Nostromo was written by Conrad.

If propositions are structured, and mirror the structures of sentences, then (5) and (6) have different contents. If so, by IB, (7) and (8) can differ
Independence of belief

in truth value. But, (7) and (8) cannot differ in truth value, so, propositions are not structured.

In response to both arguments, I note the following about IB. Firstly, that there are apparent counterexamples to it, e.g., that it seems to be impossible to believe a conjunction without believing its conjuncts. Secondly, that it has been rejected in the literature on propositions. So, even if it is true, IB is not something that can be assumed without argument. Thirdly, that several theories of propositions, on both sides of the fine/coarse and structured/unstructured debate, are incompatible with IB. I show this for the theory that propositions are sets of circumstances, and that propositions are acts of predication. So, argument two has a premise which can reasonably be denied. Regarding argument one, this shows that the explanation available to the fine-grained theory is more complicated than it might seem, because it is committed to a controversial principle that must be defended, and, therefore, that the explanation offered by a coarse-grained theory might be overall better.

References


This talk presents the main tenets of a version of the view of intentional anti-realism (a version for which I argue elsewhere), and attempts to show how it avoids two (related) major difficulties that threaten this view— the one concerning the intentional (or cognitive) suicide charge and the one concerning these views’ implication for the issue of truth.

According to the presented view, no concrete entity can instantiate intentional properties. Put differently, content ascriptions possess only practice-dependent, rather than absolute, truth conditions. The sole criterion for the truth of any content ascription is conforming to a practice of content ascription, while such practices cannot be true (or false) and so cannot endow individual content ascriptions with absolute truth values. In one respect, the intentional anti-realism that I endorse is less radical than mental eliminativism such as Paul Churchland’s, as it acknowledges the existence of mental states, e.g. such that have the characteristics typically attributed to beliefs and desires minus intentional properties (call these "beliefs*" and desires*, respectively).

Intentional anti-realism might seem to involve an epistemic catastrophe – that of robbing beliefs of their essential epistemic asset, since a view that repudiates intentionality deprives representational truth conditions and truth values of all beliefs and sentences. This radical nature of the view also appears to put it in an especially vulnerable position vis-à-vis the cognitive suicide charge, since it implies that the view cannot acknowledge the possibility of its own linguistic expression.

The charge of cognitive/intentional suicide cannot plausibly be that mental eliminativism, or intentional anti-realism, is inconsistent, for a mental-free and intentionality-free world is logically possible. Probably, the charge is (as some philosophers construe it) that the conjunction of eliminative materialism – or intentional anti-realism – and presuppositions of its own articulation and defense is inconsistent. I will first argue that the self-referential element of this charge can only sustain an ad hominem argument against the proponent of intentional anti-realism, and so the charge can
only be rooted in this view’s commitment to denying that any view can be asserted (or believed). For this charge to undermine intentional anti-realism, it must be assumed that indeed people’s assertions can express views, yet assuming this would beg the question against intentional anti-realism. Still, denying this assumption might raise the issue of the epistemic status of assertions in general and of assertions such as “There can be no intentional states” in particular. Since on the suggested version of intentional anti-realism mental states have logical-syntactic structures and coherence is a logical-syntactic matter, this version can be incorporated with a coherentist theory of truth. It thus makes room for the notion of truth of beliefs*. So according to it, the intentional realist’s belief* ”There can be no intentional states” may be true and is true. It is true, like most other true beliefs* in having a ”correct” logical-syntactic structure (relative to the other elements of our web of knowledge); providing an effective argument for it is showing just this. Various complications for this view are addressed.
Early modern philosophers have long struggled with finding the right argument to justify the claim that agents can and do have rational beliefs. In particular, both early modern rationalists and early modern empiricists sought answers to a shared research question. Namely, what are the fundamental aspects of an account of correct reasoning that explains how the deviations from rational judgment can be corrected or avoided?

Interestingly, this question seems to have fallen into oblivion in much of contemporary analytic philosophy. Indeed, much of analytic philosophy today assumes rationality but does not explain what rationality is. More precisely, analytic philosophers assume rationality to explain how agents pursue self-interested goals, act following established rules, internalize external stimuli, and forecast the outcomes of their decisions. Besides, analytic philosophers assume rationality to explain how knowledge drives rational mental deductions. In simpler terms, analytic philosophers consider rationality a universal and first principle without justifying why they claim cognition, behavior, and communication to be rational activities beforehand.

Though we do not dispute the methodological convenience of assuming rationality in philosophical arguments that employ closed world assumptions, we fear that this assumption entails severe problems in terms of external validity. Accordingly, our goal is to show that returning to the early modern philosophers’ common research question might enable analytic philosophers to formulate arguments that start from externally valid assumptions.

Specifically, we seek an answer to the above research question in Herbert Simon’s and Gert Gigerenzer’s studies on bounded rationality. On this basis, we show that Herbert Simon’s and Gert Gigerenzer’s works point to the fact that assuming rationality in philosophical arguments is methodologically sound as far as the impact of emotional triggers and cognitive heuristics on human judgment is explicitly ignored. Therefore, given that rationality is
constrained or quasi-absent, at least in some cases, assuming rationality to be a universal and first principle, as analytic philosophers do, might limit the generalizability of the conclusions of philosophical arguments.

On these grounds, we conclude that the assumption of rationality is externally valid IFF philosophical accounts of cognition, behavior, and communication are open to counterfactuals. For counterfactuals allow accounting for instances in which rationality is strong and cases in which rationality is limited. Notably, we motivate this claim with several examples from empirical studies in the social sciences showing why the assumption of rationality is problematic.
The idea that the content recovered by the addressee in the course of utterance interpretation may vary on the precision parameter has been around for some time, with a number of experiments providing evidence that when processing utterances people often end up with incomplete meaning representations (Barton and Sanford 1993; Karimi and Ferreira 2016; Park and Reder 2004; Reder and Kusbit 1991; Sanford 2002; Sanford and Graesser 2006). It is revealed that the so-called “good-enough” interpretation (Ferreira et al. 2002; Karimi and Ferreira 2016) may be preferred to a complete representation.

These findings align closely with the postulates put forth within relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995; Wilson and Sperber 2012), such as that in verbal communication the speaker’s goal is to produce certain cognitive effects in the hearer and the hearer’s goal is to recover the speaker-intended cognitive effects by following the path of least effort. This means that in performing different tasks involved in utterance comprehension, the interpreter seeks cognitive satisfaction, operationalized in the relevance-theoretic framework as optimal relevance, in which the effort invested in the processing of verbal input returns sufficient cognitive effects. This applies to both explicit and implicit levels of meaning, posited to be obtained simultaneously in the process of mutual parallel adjustment, during which inferential processes operate on decoded linguistic meaning to yield contextually-adjusted output.

This paper adopts the methodology of relevance theory to explore some implications of the “good-enough interpretation” standpoint on the notions of “proposition expressed” and “literal meaning” of utterances. On the one hand, the idea that explicit and implicit meanings are derived in parallel (rather than sequentially) provides a justification for the claim that explicit meanings can be propositionally incomplete, being only “good enough” to be a carrier of speaker-intended implicatures constituting the main import of an utterance, but on the other, it sheds some doubt on the psychological reality and theoretical status of the above-mentioned notions.
By analysing a variety of non-figurative, metaphorical, metonymic and ironic utterances, we aim to show how indeterminacy may surface at various levels of interpretation, including the level of the proposition expressed, and remain unresolved, resulting in saving effort, but at the same time ensuring satisfying cognitive gains. On this approach, shallow interpretations, incorporating conceptually frugal mental representations in which some content remains schematic, are perfectly sufficient for successful communication to be achieved. In our view, these observations provide arguments that the only robust distinction may exist between decoded and inferred meaning, with other dichotomies, such as “proposition expressed vs. implicatures”, being only functional labels.

References


Cooper (1983) proposed that gendered pronouns trigger presuppositions about the referent’s gender. This idea was further popularised in linguistics by Heim and Kratzer (1998) and has later found its way into philosophy (Dembroff Wodak 2018). Cooper (1983) believes that while the anaphoric pronouns trigger presuppositions in a typical way, the presuppositions triggered by deictic pronouns differ from those triggered by anaphoric pronouns. In the case of deictic pronouns the presuppositions about the referent’s gender are indexical meaning that they have to be satisfied in the actual world. Yanovich (2010) argues that all gendered pronouns (deictic, anaphoric, or bound) trigger indexical presuppositions, meaning that gendered pronouns trigger presuppositions in a different way that the typical examples of presupposition triggers.

In our talk, we want to agree with Yanovich, and put forward the hypothesis that gendered personal pronouns trigger presuppositions about the referent’s gender, in opposition to the claim that the use of a gendered pronoun entails information about the referent’s gender. We claim that in both cases of gendered pronoun usage – anaphoric and deictic – its processing relies vastly on context cues, and that virtually the only difference between the two uses is what kind of context is at play. The argument for this claim is twofold. First, we present what Strawson called the “squeamishness” effect of false presuppositions (Strawson 1950) and appeal to the audience’s intuitions concerning the use of a wrong gendered pronoun in a context. Second, we claim that our approach, apart from its intuitive appeal and theoretical strength, can also serve as a starting point for an analysis of different manifestations of grammatical gender in natural language.

References

Gendered Personal Pronouns as Presupposition Triggers


In the recent years one can observe growing interest in the issue of contextualism in the philosophy of language, this is the view that emphasizes the role that extralinguistic context plays in determining linguistic meaning (cf. Recanati 2004, 2010; Travis 1997; Borg 2004, Cappelen Lepore 2005, Stanley 2007). Traditionally, following Grice (1957), it is claimed that one should distinguish between context-invariant sentence meaning and context-sensitive content of utterance.

The advocates of contextualism claim that there are much more context-dependent expressions than the obvious ones (“I”, “that”, “tomorrow”, “foreign” etc). To support their claim, they use different type of arguments: (i) they claim that when extralinguistic context is shifting, there is also a change in meaning; (ii) they claim that semantically determined truth-conditions are unintuitive and play no role in ordinary communication; (iii) they claim that semantics is unable to determine the meaning of the sentence and there is a need for involvement of certain pragmatic processes.

In my presentation I am going to investigate more closely several scenarios presented by contextualist as a challenge for semantic literalism/minimalism. These have been the subject of an intense debate but I would like to tackle them from a little unorthodox perspective, namely normative inferentialism (Brandom 1994, 2000; Peregrin, 2014; Drobňák 2019). It is a theory that identifies sentence meaning with the role conferred to that sentence by rules governing three types of inferential transitions (from situations to sentences, from sentences to sentences, and from sentences to actions). To illustrate how inferentialist conceive meaning and content, let me use the language and games analogy. The role a pawn plays within the game of chess is conferred to a wooden piece by the set of rules:

(R1) a pawn can be moved one box forward
(R2) if it is the pawn’s first move, it can be moved two boxes forward
(R3) a pawn can capture one of the opponent’s pieces by moving diagonally forward one square to the left or right
(R4) a pawn on its fifth rank may capture an enemy pawn on an adjacent file that has moved two squares in a single move, as if the pawn had moved only one square (en passant).

So, the meaning of certain linguistic expression is analogous to the whole spectrum of moves (inferences) one is allowed/prescribed/forbidden to make and it involves collateral premises (e.g. “a pawn on its fifth rank” or “enemy pawn on an adjacent file that has moved two squares”). The content of the utterance is just a subset of that whole spectrum of possible moves.

According to normative inferentialism it is possible to conceive sentence meaning as broad, but invariant and content of utterance as a part of that broad sentence meaning. In my presentation I show how several prominent scenarios sketched by contextualists as a challenge against semantic minimalism/literalism can be understood by normative inferentialist.
The debates over the problem of faultless disagreement have played a major role in shaping the landscape of today’s semantic theories. It seems that nowadays there are three main contenders who, often forming alliances, have something interesting to say about disagreements involving the subjective (taste, goodness or beauty): contextualism, relativism and expressivism. Additionally, there are many pragmatic, metalinguistic and hybrid accounts which offer alternative explanations of the phenomenon. In my presentation, I argue that even though the existent proposals explain a lot of disagreement data by specifying various ways in which speakers may use subjective predicates, neither provides a unitary account which would explain what all the subjective disagreements have in common. In particular, what is lacking is the explanation of the persistent autocentric cases (Lasersohn 2004), i.e. disagreements in which each speaker expresses a subjective judgment while openly and knowingly occupying his or her own perspective. In my paper I offer a solution which consists in supplementing the standard contextual semantics with an explanation of this most problematic class of cases, which would be possible due to a shift in the level of description of the phenomena to the speech act nomenclature. I claim that in uttering a subjective evaluative judgment, such as:

This cake is tasty,

a speaker may perform a number of speech acts. Typically, she will assert that the cake is tasty to her (contextualist content) and she will perform an act of praising the gustatory value of the cake. Their interlocutor who disagrees, says:

This cake isn’t tasty,

asserts that the cake isn’t tasty to him, which, on its own, does not account for the disagreement intuitions, but he also performs the act of disapproving of the cake’s gustatory value. The result of an act of praising
is that of updating “the conversational scoreboard” with various kinds of commitment – perhaps of a normative character. Merely informing someone that I enjoyed the taste of something is not aimed at convincing them to assess it positively too (with all the practical consequences this may bring about). However, my open only praising the taste of this food is something that is up for discussion and does not have to be accommodated simply as a piece of information about me. If my interlocutor has reasons to disapprove of the taste of something, she may refuse to accommodate my act of praise. I believe that the disagreement intuitions of the previously unexplained kind arise and become persistent when the speakers perform the illocutionary acts identified above. The disagreeing speakers perform acts of the same kind, acts that are focused on the same object – the gustatory qualities of something – but they are characterized by opposing illocutionary forces. In my paper I show reasons for treating subjective expressions as systematically used to perform speech acts of praising and disapproval and I outline the proposed notion of disagreement in illocutionary force.
Semantic externalism owes its recent revival to the growing interest in the meaning of social kind terms. Externalist approach to these terms, most prominently advocated by Sally Haslanger (Haslanger 2006, 2012), enables a semantics of social kind terms corresponding to realist social kind’s ontology, which, instead of modeling all social kinds on conventionalist institutional kinds, takes social phenomena such as race or parent as self-standing, that is – objective, even if socially constructed. Externalism does so by allowing that referents of social kind terms remain fixed regardless of the conceptions or intuitions ordinary speakers may associate with those referents. This is achieved due the distinction between “manifest” and “operative” concepts. The former indicate the widely held by speakers and often misleading explicit beliefs about the nature of a term’s referent. The latter – what actually a referent is according to practices constituting given kind. While promising, this approach, nevertheless, faces several challenges arising from the shift from natural to social kinds. Some of these challenges concern the processes of reference-fixing and focus either on the role of speakers’ conceptions or the character of relevant referents. As pointed out by Esa Díaz-León (2012), in some cases (e.g. “parent”) it is an examination of speakers’ beliefs that provides the best method of revealing the operative concept. Jeff Engelhardt (2018), on the other hand, points out that for some polysemic terms, where given word-form functions simultaneously as natural and social term (like “fruit”), it is hard to find genuine objective types, that would fix the extensions of different instances. Further, one may add, even when speakers’ conceptions do not constitute given kinds, and even if they are altogether inaccurate, they sometimes contribute to the reality of a certain social kind. (As it is with race and racism where racist beliefs and attributions of racial categories coordinate relevant practices.) As a result externalist theorist find herself in paradoxical position where once displaced speakers conceptions and beliefs about a practice strike again as what the very practice in question consists of. A remedy to this problem I propose is to incorporate into the externalist framework a version of Brandomian (Brandom 1994, 2001) inferentialism that has been surprisingly absent in the
debate. In this view, the meaning of a social kind term, instead of depending on reference, is determined by inferential roles of term’s uses in utterances and those roles are derived from the practices constituting relevant social kinds. I argue that this move answers to the “conceptions problem” by making conceptual content of a term itself external to the heads of the speakers; the “reference problem” by prioritizing inference over reference in general; and the “coordinative conception-attribution problem” by dynamic and revisory notion of attribution of concept. At the same time this approach preserves the operative – manifest distinction as the one between inferences implicit in the practices and explicit in discourse.

References


In this presentation I argue for what may seem a “crazy thesis” (CT for short). CT has two versions: negative and positive. The negative CT, roughly, says: accounting for disagreement is no test for viability of contextualism about modals because genuine disagreement is not a phenomenon that is observed in the kind of discourse contexts, usually presented as problematic for contextualism (see BET and MINERS). The positive CT says: contextualism about discourse modality can be saved without accommodating disagreement.

Here is the plan of my talk. First, I argue for plausibility of the negative CT. My way of doing this consists of two prongs. One prong is to propose a definition of genuine disagreement that captures intuitions of ordinary language users. Second prong is to offer a novel, yet contextualism-friendly interpretation of what is going on in the so-called disagreement about taste. I focus on the analysis of taste disagreement because this sort of discourse situation is widely considered as a paradigmatic case of disagreement. My aim is to put into doubt that view by offering an interpretation of the situation in TASTE that meets the expectation of being contextualist, but at the same time is such that undermines genuine disagreement to be the case. Having done this, I move to my arguments for the positive CT. To that aim I discuss epistemic use of ‘ought’ in MacFarlane’s famous example of a bet. I offer my own interpretation of the situation in BET and explain why standard contextualist explanation is implausible and should be dropped at no cost of losing contextualism. What is to be lost once and for all is the idea that “lost disagreement” problem is a fatal problem for contextualism. It is not. One can be a contextualist, and yet find genuine disagreement impossible. In the last part of my talk I sketch my programme of saving contextualism for modals that makes no room for disagreement. The position that I advocate I call “framework-context contextualism” (FCC). The key explanatory notion in FCC is the notion of framework-context (FC). FC is to be responsible for determining the value of the modal base. In particular, I claim that it is the contextually supplied framework information and not the agent-centric information which is crucial to the meaning of the epistemic modal. This
framework information, I stipulate, consists of all the relevant information connected with the kind of situation that the context in question permits. For example, if we are in a BET-like context, then the framework information is made up by all the information it is sensible to expect from you to have when you are putting a bet: here the information of crucial significance seems to be about the past record of winnings of the horse you want to bet on. FCC directs our attention away from the agent-centered epistemic position onto the framework-context epistemic situation. Importantly, FCC postulates to give no ear to eavesdroppers!
I develop an expressivist account of verbal disagreements as practical disagreements over how to interpret language. This account has several advantages: it analyzes verbal disagreement entirely in terms of the internal mental states of speakers; it accounts for speakers who are undecided on how to interpret an expression; it can be formalized in a neo-Stalnakerian framework of communication; and it unifies and makes precise ideas behind many accounts in the literature.

Three clarifications: (1) Following the literature, I use ‘disagreement’ for conflicts in attitude and ‘dispute’ for linguistic exchanges. (2) The label ‘verbal’, as I use it, is not meant to imply the disagreement is “merely apparent” or “pointless”: verbal disagreements can be genuine and important (cf. Plunkett 2013). (3) Distinguish speaker meaning, i.e., what a speaker means by an expression (“S means $m$ by $e$”), from semantic meaning, i.e., what an expression means in a language or linguistic community (“$e$ means $m$ in $L$”) (Grice 1968, Pinder 2021).

The former is determined by the speaker’s intentions, whereas the latter by the collective intentions of a community/external factors (cf. Cappelen 2018). While speakers often intend to align their speaker meaning with semantic meaning, they may choose not to (e.g., to advocate for a new meaning).

Often, speakers don’t assign a single univocal meaning to an expression: sometimes, their assigned speaker meaning is partial (e.g., one may be undecided on whether to apply ‘sandwich’ to burritos) and/or conditional (e.g., one may decide to interpret ‘planet’ as the astronomers do but be unsure how they define it).

To account for such cases, I introduce the notion of a semantic plan, i.e., a decision to associate certain meanings with certain expressions, either in general or for a particular situation. We can analyze semantic plans as sets of semantic hyperplans, i.e., maximally specific plans for how to interpret language in any situation (cf. Gibbard 2003)—formally, functions from worlds to interpretation functions. A speaker’s mental state is modeled as a pair $B, H$ where $BW$ is a belief state and $H$ is a set of semantic hyperplans.
A speaker \( S \) \( B, H \) leaves open an interpretation \( i \) if \( h(w) = i \) for some \( h \in H \) and some \( w \in B \).

A disagreement over \( \phi \) is wholly verbal if on any interpretation \( i \) left open by either speaker, the disagreement would dissolve were the other speaker to adopt \( i \).

It is wholly factual if on any \( i \) left open by either speaker, the disagreement would persist were the other speaker to adopt \( i \). And it is partly verbal if it is neither wholly verbal nor wholly factual.

The formal details are omitted, but fig1 and fig4 contain visual examples of the account using colored truth matrices.

Communication on this account can be implemented in a neo-Stalnakerian framework where common ground and assertoric content are analyzed as sets of interpretation-world pairs (cf. Kocurek et al. 2020).

So the common ground encodes speakers’ shared factual assumptions and assumptions about how to interpret language. While assertion doesn’t directly state what a speaker’s semantic plans are (‘Pluto is a planet’ is not synonymous with ‘I use ‘planet’ to include Pluto’), it does express said plans (cf. Yalcin 2012, MacFarlane 2016). Hence the ‘expressivist’ label.

This account unifies and clarifies many extant accounts of verbal disputes. On Balcerak and Jackson’s (2014) and Jenkins’ (2014) account, speakers in a verbal dispute don’t disagree over the same topic or question. The expressivist vindicates this intuition by modeling topics/questions as partitions on \( W \) (Hamblin 1973, Lewis 1988b).

On Chalmers’ (2011) account, verbal disputes ”arise wholly in virtue of disagreements about meaning”.

The expressivist understands this gloss constitutively: difference in interpretation is part of what it is for a disagreement to be verbal. Finally, on Hirsch’s (2009) account, speakers in verbal disputes can “charitably interpret” each other so as to recognize the other’s assertion as true. An interpretation is “charitable”, for the expressivist, if it’s left open by the speaker’s beliefs and semantic plans.
Verbal Disagreement and Semantic Plans

Figure 1: Simple examples of the expressivist account where speakers’ semantic plans are complete and unconditional. Shaded cells represent the interpretation-world pairs left open by applying the speaker’s semantic plan to their beliefs. Blue speaker accepts $\phi$, while Red speaker rejects it.

Figure 2: Visual demonstration that the top matrix represents a partly verbal disagreement.

Figure 3: Visualization of complete vs. partial and unconditional vs. conditional semantic plans.

Figure 4: Examples of wholly verbal disagreements with different kinds of semantic plans.
References


There has been much recent interest in the use of causal models to evaluate counterfactual sentences (Pearl, 2009), and how such methods relate to possible-worlds theories of counterfactuals such as Lewis (1973). Pearl identifies a possible world with an instantiation of the (values of) variables in a causal model. On the other hand, information about the causal laws is not included in the possible worlds themselves, but rather in a similarity metric among the worlds (variously implemented as an accessibility relation, selection function, system of spheres, ordering source, etc.). Extensions of Pearl’s framework (Briggs, 2012; Halpern, 2013), as well as closely related formulations using premise semantics (Kaufmann, 2013; Santorio, 2014; Ciardelli et al., 2018) share this division of labor between possible worlds and the similarity metric.

We argue that causal information should not only be encoded in the similarity metric, but also inside of the possible worlds themselves, e.g., as propositions. In other words, possible worlds are causal worlds, as defined in Pearl (2009) (albeit for a different purpose). We discuss two advantages of our proposal.

First, we note that unlike in other theories, modus ponens is not invalidated in our approach. Briggs (2012) describes a counterexample involving nested counterfactuals, of the form $\phi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \delta)$, where the variable $\phi$ is causally dependent on $\psi$, and $\delta$ is dependent on both $\phi$ and $\psi$. Intervening to make $\phi$ true (setting $\phi = 1$) breaks the dependence between $\phi$ and $\psi$, changing the model, even if $\phi$ happened to be true in the actual world (because of the value of $\psi$). In that case, the entire counterfactual can be true, as can $\phi$, while the counterfactual consequent $\psi \rightarrow \delta$ is false. However, if we distinguish between the world where $\phi$ is set to 1, from the actual world where $\phi$ is true because of $\psi$, we can interpret the antecedent not as representing the value of a variable, but as whether some causal law holds. We can then say that the first world satisfies the antecedent, while the actual world does not, and modus ponens does not apply.
Second, by incorporating causal information into possible worlds, we can naturally generalize probabilistic causal models to cases where there is uncertainty in the causal model itself. In causal models, and previous possible-worlds translations thereof, it is assumed that the causal laws are known. Even in probabilistic causal models, the probability distribution is defined only over the background variables. Pearl (2009) then introduces causal worlds as the deterministic limit of a probabilistic model (where there is a single instantiation of background variables with probability 1). If we take causal worlds as primitive instead, we can equivalently define a probabilistic causal model as a set of causal worlds, sharing a single set of causal laws, with a probability distribution over those worlds. Uncertainty in the causal laws can then be represented by allowing for the probability distribution to range over worlds with different laws.

References


Semantic atomism is an interesting alternative to holism and molecularism, but it seems to suffer from subtle complications that involve tacit polysemy and difficulties with communication. Looking to Jerry Fodor’s formulation of atomism, it roughly makes use of concepts to play the role of meanings. We can use his notion of complex concepts to derive the theoretical possibility of concepts that that mirror a given complex concept with the exception of their structure. In effect, every complex concept has a structurally simple counterpart; a correlate for short. They share the same content, functional roles, representational features, etc., but correlates are atomic. That difference also means that the complex and the correlate have different possession conditions, which allow us to clearly delineate between them.

With correlates in hand, we can consider their relation to simple expressions composed of multiple free morphemes, like “doorknob” or “breakfast.” Where Fodor assumes that monomorphemic items express simple concepts, these polymorphemes presumably express complex concepts composed of, for instance, DOOR and KNOB. Insofar as they express complex concepts, there are correlates that mirror them. Given an atomistic picture of concept acquisition, we’re warranted in suggesting that there are individuals who acquire a correlate prior to ever acquiring the matching complex. In the case of “doorknob,” it’s plausible to believe that children acquire and use the expression accurately without possessing the concept KNOB in isolation. If so, we can deduce that they must be using the correlate. That implies that one and the same polymorpheme may express two distinct concepts.

We seem to arrive at a peculiar form of polysemy where one word expresses two concepts that share the same content and yet are clearly distinct along theoretical lines. While Fodor and Lepore endeavored to argue against polysemy, either ruling it out entirely for expressions like “keep” and “want” or otherwise treating polysemy as a special form of homonymy in the case of “bake” and “lamb,” neither set of arguments apply to polymorphemes like “doorknob.” It appears to be genuinely (and unusually) polysemous; and worse, it’s unique to atomism, as it follows from its rather idiosyncratic take on concepts. It also translates to issues with communication, in that
when a polymorpheme is used, we can establish that it must express either the complex or the correlate, while failing to have any practical means for discerning which it actually expresses. Moreover, the difference between a communicative success and failure is rendered indistinguishable in terms of its consequences; if the listener couldn’t possibly have understood the speaker because the former only has the complex and the latter only has the correlate, the listener will still comply as if he understood. This perplexing state of affairs appears to be fully warranted by atomism’s theoretical architecture. While atomists are perhaps best known for their criticisms of competing positions, it seems that atomism suffers from some interesting problems of its own.

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Do we lie only when we explicitly say something that we believe to be false? Theorists and laypersons generally count only explicit assertions of falsehoods as lies; implicitly conveyed falsehoods are merely misleading (Augustine 395, Fricker 2012, Saul 2012, Green 2015, Viebahn 2017, García-Carpintero 2018, Stokke 2018). However, it is questionable that the lying/misleading distinction is morally significant (Saul 2012). In this paper I will argue that the distinction is also untenable from the viewpoint of speaker and hearer interaction and that empirical confirmation of the distinction is irrelevant.

To count a speaker S as lying is for the hearer H to hold S responsible for her utterance U. My contention is that H’s recourse to explicit meaning is actually ineffective for the purposes of accountability. If explicitness is required, S will escape liability by claiming that her intention was different from what H took it to be. This escape is facilitated by the phenomenon of context sensitivity which, if it is ubiquitous as contextualists contend (Recanati 2010 and Sperber Wilson 2012), makes most meaning implicit. Furthermore, even if H holds S responsible only for the explicit meaning of U, S may claim that she did not speak seriously (see Fricker 2012 for an authentic example). Since ultimately implicitness is the rule, it will not be possible for H to hold S responsible at all, unless H is entitled to invoke her assumptions concerning the meaning of U. Thus, the question is not whether meaning was explicitly or implicitly conveyed, but whether H’s interpretation is epistemically warranted. Because H’s claim when holding S responsible for U takes the form of the most reasonable interpretation of U, the lying/misleading distinction cannot be upheld.

Recently Weissman Terkourafi (2019) have tested the contention that false implicatures are lies (Meibauer 2011, Sternau et al. 2016) experimentally. The result that informants have a tendency not to count implicitly conveyed falsehoods as lies is taken to speak in favour of the robustness of the lying/misleading distinction. I find the appeal to intuitions methodologically problematic. In so far as people are culturally inculcated to make this distinction the result was only to be expected. The lying/misleading distinction is not in need of empirical confirmation, but of justification: are there good
conceptual or moral reasons for making it? From this perspective, the real finding of the test is that people do admit that some implicit communication is lying. This points to the instability of intuitions and speaks actually in favour of abandoning the distinction.

My argument does not imply that there is no difference between deception by explicit and implicit means respectively. It might indeed be more difficult for H to argue that S lied when S conveyed the falsehood implicitly. However, H’s argument does not depend on explicitness as such, but solely on the warrantability of H’s interpretation.

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Situation semanticists hold that sentences and the propositions they express are true or false at possible situations, which are taken to be parts of possible worlds. As Kratzer (1989) has pointed out, the interpretation of negation raises tricky questions for situation semantics. In particular, Kratzer argues that negation in natural languages can’t be interpreted as classical truth-functional negation if all propositions expressed in language are persistent. Since Kratzer assumes that all propositions expressed are persistent, Kratzer suggests that negation has a non-truth-functional interpretation. But rejecting that negation is truth-functional has unwelcome consequences. In this talk, I therefore revisit Kratzer’s argument.

A sentence or a proposition is persistent just in case, if it is true at some situation s, it is also true at all situations of which s is a part. Suppose that there is no chair in some particular situation s that is part of a larger situation s’ in which there is a chair, and consider the following sentences:

(I) There is a chair.

(NI) There isn’t a chair.

In that case, (I) is not true at s but true at s’. If negation were classical, (NI), the negation of (I), would thus be true at s but false at s’, and so (NI) wouldn’t be persistent, or so Kratzer’s argument goes. To avoid such failures of persistence, Kratzer then suggests to adopt a non-truth-functional semantics for negation. By contrast, I explore a strategy that relies on a truth-functional but trivalent semantics for negation. In a nutshell, the suggestion is that (I) is neither true nor false at s. If, in addition, we assume that Not A is neither true nor false if the sentence A is neither true nor false, it follows that (NI) is also neither true nor false at s. Consequently, the example doesn’t show that (NI) is not persistent, since it’s not the case that (NI) is true at s but false at s’. I discuss some motivations for this view as well as some problems that it faces.
References

What-Is-Said by Belief Ascriptions

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What-Is-Said by Belief Ascriptions

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Millianism, the view that the contribution of proper names to what is said by sentences containing them is only their referent, is seemingly inconsistent with how we ascribe beliefs and intentionality in general to cognitive agents. According to Millianism, (1) ‘Lois Lane believes that Superman flies’ and (2) ‘Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies’ say the same thing about Lois Lane’s mental life because their only difference is in the names ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’, which is irrelevant to what is said by them since they corefer. However, contrary to Millianism, (1) and (2) not only seem to say different things – (1) is about a belief about a superhero and (2) is about a belief about a reporter for the Daily Planet – but they also seem to have different truth-values – (1) seems to be true but (2), false.

How to conciliate Millianism with our intuitions has been the topic of a heated debate among Millians. Some have suggested that (1) and (2) are about different beliefs because beliefs have a content and a perspective (a way of thinking of the content), and (1) and (2) are about beliefs with different perspectives, namely, Superman as a superhero and as a reporter, respectively, albeit with the same content, namely, Superman flying (see Kaplan [1989], Perry [1990, 1998], Soames [2015] to some extent, among many others of the so-called Neo-Russellian tradition). Thus, (1) and (2) say different things, which also explains their difference in truth-value. Others have argued that our intuitions are misleading, and that (1) and (2) are indeed about the same belief, and that, since Lois believes that Superman flies, both (1) and (2) are true (see Salmon [1986]).

Here I argue that both proposals are problematic. I present cases which suggest that whether (1) and (2) are about the different beliefs and have different truth-values varies according to our interest in Lois’s mental life. In some contexts, we are interested how Lois thinks of Superman and, consequently, (1) and (2) are about different beliefs and have different truth-values; as when we are debating whether to yell ‘Superman is behind you’ or ‘Clark Kent is behind you’ at Lois to help her escape from a dangerous situation, one could argue that the former is better because (1) is true but (2) is false. In other contexts, however, we do not care about how she thinks
about Superman, therefore, (1) and (2) are about the same belief and have the same truth-value; as when we are counting how many people are believed by Lois as someone who flies, when we consider Clark Kent, it makes sense to say that she believes it and that (2) is true.

Based on this new data, I propose a modification of Predelli’s (2005) account of the truth-conditions of sentences like (1) and (2), whereby the relevance of how Lois thinks of Superman is incorporated as a parameter of evaluation of the sentence, and not as part of their content. This framework has the flexibility required to correctly capture what we say with them and their truth-value in different contexts because each utterance of (1) and (2) may get different parameters of evaluation depending on what we care about when we use the sentences.

References


Some famous examples due to Benson Mates (1950) have been taken by many to suggest that intersubstitutability for some word or phrase becomes more stringent, the more multiply embedded it is in the scopes of attitude verbs. (The examples have also been taken to suggest an entirely distinct point: that intersubstitutability is sensitive to whether substitution changes logical form. That separate point is not at issue in my discussion; I will briefly explain why it is independent of the claim about degrees of embedding.) I wish to explore this claim and decide how it is best elaborated and explained.

One idea is that it is best elaborated as a claim about logical form, and that the explanation of it would come from a hierarchical theory of logical form such as Frege’s. On that view, the contribution that a word makes to a sentence’s truth condition depends on how multiply embedded it is in the scopes of attitude verbs. When singly embedded, it contributes its sense; when doubly embedded, it contributes its indirect sense; and so on. Frege’s famous—or notorious—“hierarchy of senses” has been claimed by some (Burge, Fine, Horwich) to support an explanation of the phenomenon apparently illustrated in Mates’s examples.

I will argue that this is not the case—indeed that no claim about logical form could explain the Matesian phenomena.

The first step is to distinguish two radically different things one can mean by “intersubstitutability”: intersubstitutability salva veritate (ISV), and intersubstitutability on grounds of logical form (ILF). A claim about ILF concerns the provability of ISV in the semantics of a logical-form-giving language. Elaborating the embedding claim as a claim about ILF results in a claim that some expressions that are ILF when singly embedded, fail to be ILF when doubly (etc.) embedded.

The problem is that no claim that ISV cannot be proved in the semantics—which is what a claim about ILF says—can entail what is required for the Matesian phenomena, which is that ISV fails to obtain (in the multiply embedded occurrences).

What then are we to make of the original idea, that intersubstitutability gets more stringent the more we embed within attitude verbs? The solution
is to take this as a metaphysical claim, about relations obtaining necessarily among attitudes. Post-Kripke we are all comfortable with the claim that some necessarily obtaining relations are not due to relations among meanings: are not analytic, in any sense. The Mates examples point us to a range of cases that illustrate this same point. That they have not been taken to do so is due I think to a mistake: that of taking intersubstitutability within attitude ascriptions to be some sort of touchstone for sameness of linguistic meaning. It is not. The Mates cases, then, illustrate how difficult it is sometimes to distentangle semantic and metaphysical claims.
In this talk, I would like to explain some failures of salva veritate substitutivity in belief contexts by pointing to the subject’s lack of knowledge of semantic equivalence. In doing so, I will look at Jeff Speaks’ recent book The Greatest Possible Being (2018), where he argues against a version of Perfect Being Semantics (say, PBS-3). PBS-3 is the view that ‘God’ and ‘the greatest possible being’ are semantically equivalent. Speaks argues that this version is incorrect — if ‘God’ and ‘the greatest possible being’ were in fact semantically equivalent, then the two terms would be intersubstitutable salva veritate in all contexts — including belief context. But they are not, so ‘God’ and ‘the greatest possible being’ are not semantically equivalent. So, Speaks assumes that semantic equivalence is sufficient for the substitution of co-referring terms salva veritate in belief contexts. Call this Speaks’ Sufficiency Thesis (ST). Indeed, ST is a thesis that many philosophers of language would accept. But I argue against it. I argue that ST can’t be true, since there are cases of substitution failure in certain belief contexts whose explanation requires something other than semantic equivalence, namely, a subject’s knowledge of semantic equivalence. As I see it, it’s a subject’s knowledge of semantic equivalence that guarantees the substitution of co-referring terms salva veritate in certain belief contexts. If my thesis is true, then Speaks has not shown that Perfect Being Semantics is incorrect.
There is no discussion around the fact that emotions do have a form of content, but its nature remains unclear [1]. In the wake of Brentano’s theory of intentionality, Twardowski [2] sketched a theory of content that can shed some light on emotional content – provided that we consider emotions as mental acts. Emotions have two peculiar properties that are of interest for us: they are simultaneously highly subjective but easily identifiable by outsiders [3], they can also be directed toward counterfactuals objects the same way they are toward regular ones. We want to show that those two points make the case for a Twardowskian theory of emotional content.

First, the content can be the link between the subjective and collective. An intentional theory of emotions with only mind and object fails to account for the unpredictability of emotional reaction: many individuals may react differently to one event, furthermore, one individual is prone to react differently to the repetition of one event – in both case there can be contradictory reactions. Emotions stem from the personal interpretation of the world. When one shares an emotion, one shares two things: a content plus the emotion, and the two are received by outsiders. When Mathieu misses the train that would take him to his wedding, his anger may be directed toward the leaving train, but it makes sense because of the implications and they are not objectives, they are contextual to him. The power of his anger would not make sense for anybody unaware of the wedding, yet everybody would avoid him.

Second, emotions can be misdirected: Mathieu is actually on the wrong platform, he did not miss his train. We have to consider the object as nonexistent but then how to make sense of his anger? The content of his anger is the link between the emotion and the counterfactual object. We believe that Twardowski’s ideas about objectless representation brings some clues for accounting for counterfactuals objects of emotions [4].

Twardowski [2] showed that, unlike objects, content exists only dependently to the mind. It behaves like a mental representation of the external world. If the direction of fit [5] of emotion in its conative sense – hence world-to-mind – is the most intuitive, the cognitive sense – mind-to-world –
A Twardowskian account of emotional content is the most interesting setting to study the content of emotions. This talk is not a rescue party for Twardowski’s theory of objects but a proposal of redirection toward philosophy of emotions.

References


One of the challenges that a theorist of vagueness faces is to provide an account that makes a disagreement concerning clear cases of a given vague predicate canonical while making a disagreement concerning borderline cases faultless. One way of doing this consists in interpreting the exchange concerning the borderline case metalinguistically as a disagreement over the adequate standard of tallness that should be adopted in a given conversation (see e.g. Barker 2013). However, metalinguistic interpretation is plausible only for some conversations and in particular it cannot be used to explain the forced march version of the sorites paradox in which the whole sorites series is assessed. Another way consists in saying that disagreement concerning borderline cases is faultless, since there are no linguistic rules that dictate how one should assess such cases and each of the opposite judgments is permissible. This solution accounts well for the faultlessness of the exchange, but the intuition of disagreement seems to be lost.

I’m going to argue that there is a better way of explaining the disagreements over vague predicates which consists in claiming that the speech act that consists in uttering Philip is tall when Philip is clearly tall and the speech act that consists in uttering Philip is tall when Philip is borderline tall are acts with different illocutionary forces. While the utterances concerning clear cases are straightforward assertions, utterances concerning borderline cases should be assertives weaker than assertions, since they express only a weak belief of the speaker (Hawthorne et al.). I believe the idea that borderline utterances should not be classified as correct assertions to be a compelling one whatever view of assertion one subscribes to. Competent reflexive speakers are aware that they are talking about cases that are not clear and they do not strongly believe in what they say. In consequence they are not putting forward what they say as true and worthy of belief. In terms of commitment the speakers of borderline utterances typically are not willing to commit to defend them if challenged. Borderline utterances are like social commitments made without corresponding private commitments. Following Incurvati Schlöder 2019, I argue that the aim of the speaker in making such an utterance p is to prevent not p from being added to the
common ground. This allows to explain why disputes concerning borderline cases are faultless and yet seem to be disagreements. They are faultless, because both the utterances are permissible (as correct weak assertives) and they feel like disagreements (since the speakers did not succeed in preventing the opposite claim from being made).

References


Recent discussion on the semantic nature of the term “know” (and its cognates) casts doubt on the linguistic data in favour of the contextualist (variantist) thesis in epistemology: that the truth conditions of knowledge sentences of the form “S knows that p” depend on contextual parameters such as intentions, purposes and presuppositions of the subjects uttering those sentences. Contextualism has been rejected by those who maintain that changes in these parameters do not penetrate into the semantic dimension of the concept of knowledge but pertain exclusively to conditions under which it is conversationally appropriate to assert the aforementioned sentences (the invariantist thesis). In the first part of this article, examples are introduced to illustrate the contextualists’ main point: that it is possible to identify contexts C1 and C2, which are in contrast in the sense that, for the sentence “S knows that p” to be true in context C1, it is expected that S has a true belief in p and that she fulfils low epistemic standards, whereas in context C2 the truth of that same sentence requires (in addition to the condition that S has a true belief that p) the fulfilment of much stricter epistemic standards (DeRose, K., 1992, 2009, Cohen, S., 1999 et al.).

Then I outline several arguments to bring into question the notion of changes in truth conditions in the example of “contrasting contexts” (Brown, J., 2003; Prichard, D., 2005; Bach, K., 2005; et al.), and discuss some attempts by contextualists to overcome challenges of this kind. Examining arguments of both sides I argue for caution in a satisfactory resolution of the dilemma between the invariantist and contextualist explanation of the role of context in determining the semantic nature of the concept of knowledge. The second part of the article discusses the broader relevance of abandoning invariantism in epistemology and demonstrates the need to re-examine the notions of context that should figure in variantist theories of knowledge. Finally, I argue that context, analysed in terms of epistemic communities, capable of capturing the intuitive data that drive the contextualist approach in epistemology while sidestepping the heavy linguistic debate at its core.
In Neo-Davidsonian semantics, sentences with prepositional phrases (PPs) and adverbs are analysed as a conjunction of predicates and thematic functions, both predicated of events. However, PPs may be also used to indicate two-place relations between new participants introduced by prepositions and one of the main verb’s arguments, but not a whole action described by the main verb,

(1) Jon saw White Walkers/them around Winterfell.

(2) Mary drank John/him under the table. (Rothstein 2004: 82).

In these examples, it is not the actions that were made around or under. Uses as such are especially challenging for Neo-Davidsonian semantics, because they constitute counterexamples to its essential claim that only events may have properties. Perhaps the best possible strategy for a Neo-Davidsonian to deal with examples (1)-(2) would be to hold that there are (basic) predicates with built-in prepositions (e.g. ‘being-located-in’) and to try to analyse the examples (1)-(2) as cases in which these (basic) predicates are used as secondary predicates. I argue that this strategy is ineffective since secondary predicates analysis (taken after Rothstein 2004) has problems of its own: 1) it provides insufficient condition and 2) cannot provide adequate truth-conditions for cases in which both the main and the secondary predicate name the same state, e.g.

(3) I am seeing myself seeing myself.

Even if a proponent of Neo-Davidsonian semantics manages to retain the essential claim that only events (not individuals) have properties and is able to provide a correct analysis for examples (1)-(3), there is another type of example which remains problematic. In (4) PPs cannot be permuted because permutation leads to a difference in truth-conditions:
(4) Bill made a sweater for Mary for Miles. (Gawron 1986: 371) *Bill made a sweater for Miles for Mary.

(4) is problematic for Neo-Davidsonian theory because both instances of for are analysed as conjunctive constraints on the event’s participants, therefore the analysis allows to freely permute them without any change in the truth-conditions.

I will present an alternative analysis to the Neo-Davidsonian which allows one to deal with problematic examples. The core idea lies in representing theta-roles not as functions from events to their participants but rather as marks on the arguments of the verb encoding the role which each argument plays. The idea itself is not novel (cf. Landman 2000, Dowty 1989, Beaver Condoravdi 2007). However, in contrast to previous proposals, labels for roles are not merely syntactic but do have semantic interpretation and this allows us to treat predicates in the way relations are treated in a relational model of data (in relational databases in computer science), as naming sets of tuples in which every object is given together with its role named by a corresponding attribute (a theta-role). Such a representation allows us to employ relational algebra calculus to calculate extensions of complex predicates – predicates built out of atomic predicates and / or atomic predicates and prepositions. I will explain the syntactic and semantic rules of the calculus and, with its help, analyse the problematic examples.
Several philosophers (including List, Pettit, Tollefsen, and several others) claim that we can truly attribute beliefs to group agents (including large and institutional groups such as corporations etc.), and that such group beliefs cannot be effectively reduced to beliefs and intentions of group members. In my talk I want to present a challenge to the claim that we can literally ascribe beliefs to group agents, based on contemporary developments in metaphysics of beliefs. The argument will have a form of a dilemma: I will argue that a proponent of group beliefs must choose between a “superficial” and representationalist conception of belief, and that both options lead to problematic consequences.

According to the view I call “superficial”, a belief is a state which attribution does not commit us to any hypotheses about the internal cognitive structure of the belief-holder: a subject must only meet some superficial criteria in order to be attributed a belief (Schwitzgebel’s neo-behaviorism and Dennett’s interpretivism are prime examples of such approach; also the “coarse-grained”, to use Block’s term, versions of functionalism might be classified under this heading). On the opposite, representationalist view (classically attributed to Fodor and more recently defended by Quilty-Dunn Mandelbaum) to attribute a belief is to make a hypothesis about an internal causally effective representational state of the subject (this is, in Block’s term, a “fine-grained” version of functionalism).

If the proponent of group belief claim endorses the “superficial” then the claim that groups can be subject of beliefs becomes true, but on pain of being of little theoretical value. A well-known consequence of the superficial account is that this position is extremely liberal with regard to attributing a status of a believer: on this take we might count thermostats and “great brain of China” (and so on) as true believers. Moreover, such superficially understood beliefs can be thought not to be genuine (i.e. causal) explanations of intentional action.

On the other hand, if the proponent of group belief endorses representationalism, then there is a strong reason to disbelieve the group belief claim. This is because on the representationalist view the status of a believer is
reserved for those things which have a relevant deep cognitive structure and realize relevant psychofunctional laws, connecting different types of mental events (i.e. connecting beliefs to memory, emotions or consciousness). However, it seems hardly probable that groups would be truly described as having internal structure and that they would realize relevant psychofunctional laws. In order to solve this dilemma, the theorists of group belief would either have to show that ascribing superficially understood beliefs to groups is genuinely explanatory or that, appearances to the contrary, groups meet the fine-grained psychofunctional criteria of belief. Although this is not impossible in principle, these are substantial theoretical debts and this fact puts pressure on the group belief theory.
A simple and attractive view about “now” and “here” is that, when used in a speech act, they pick out the time and place of that speech act. A typical token-referential view would have it that each token of “now”, when used, picks out the time of its use.

This view requires that our intuitions about the time and place of speech acts are at least as clear as our intuitions about the referents of tokens of “now” and “here”. However, there is a large class of speech acts, often called “answering machine cases”, for which this fails. Consider this speech act: at $t_1$, A writes a note to B, saying “It’s raining now, so I’m not biking to work”. At a later $t_2$, B reads the note. I would say that A asserted that it was raining at $t_1$. Now ask yourself this question: when did the speech act happen? When did A assert that it was raining at $t_1$? I do not have clear intuitions here, and I bet neither do you. I have an even less clear intuition about the corresponding “where” question. But I do have a clear intuition that that use of “now” refers to $t_1$.

So it cannot be the case that the reason that “now” picks out $t_1$ is that we have the intuition that the speech act happens at $t_1$.

But I am not merely relying on intuitions about these cases, let alone just my intuitions. Consider a different kind of act: killing. C shoots D at $t_1$ and $p_1$, while D is standing at $p_0$. D dies from the wound at $t_2$ and $p_2$, where all the times and places are different from each other. Now ask yourself: when and where did C kill D?

Davidson (1969/2001) claimed that C killed D at $t_1$ and $p_1$, and that a killing is just an event that causes a death. Thomson (1971) claimed that C killed D in the whole $t_1$–$t_2$ interval. The debate continues still. Pietroski (1998) thought we should distinguish between the action of killing, which is just the action of trying to kill and lasts little time, and the event of killing, which occupies the whole interval between the trying and the dying. The parallel with killings is important because if this lack of clear intuitions is a feature of various kinds of actions, then it is implausible that this is merely an unimportant, random fact about some speech acts.
The rest of the paper is devoted to presenting the following view, as applied to “now”:

A token \( \theta \) of the word “now”, when used in a locutionary act by a user who intends for it to have certain detonation conditions, refers to time \( t \) iff the detonation conditions of that token thus used are met at \( t \).

In its most straightforward use, a token of “now” picks out the moment of its production. Its detonation condition is so trivial that, if one focuses only on instantaneous communications, it may be almost invisible to the semanticist’s eye. “Now” may also be used as a trigger bomb: its tokens may get detonated upon the right kind of contact, for instance when the postcard is read. So a token of “now” in a postcard may pick out the time of reading because of the triggering of the detonation condition of that particular token.
The expression, ‘the use of a sentence’, cannot, without expansion, do any work at all in the theory of meaning.’
Edward Craig, “Meaning, Use, and Privacy”, p. 546

The slogan ‘meaning is use’ has both its proponents and detractors, but the claim that use, in some sense, determines meaning, is almost universally accepted (for recent discussion, see Jackman 2020). After all, what else could do it? But this raises immediately two questions:

1) What is the relevant sense of ‘use’?
2) How does use determine meaning?

In this talk I will do some groundwork that enables us to understand the first question better.

I will argue that we need to distinguish between three notions of use. First, a mere use of an expression: the tokening of an expression independently of its meaning. Such uses amount to making mere noise. In Austin’s terms, mere uses are phonetic or phatic acts (Austin 1962). Second, what Kaplan calls uses with meaning: uses while activating the expression’s meaning (Kaplan 1989b: 603). It’s only such uses that amount to speaking a language and saying something. In Austin’s terms uses with meaning are rhetic or locutionary acts.

The contrast is easy to see when we think about the so-called use-mention distinction. Consider a standard use of the English quote name ‘‘Bertrand is British’’. It’s clear that such a use results in tokening and thus merely using both the quote name ‘‘Bertrand is British’’ and the quoted sentence ‘Bertrand is British’. First, the speaker uses the quote name with its meaning which results in her mentioning the quoted sentence. However, one isn’t at the same time using the quoted sentence with its meaning because the use doesn’t result in saying that Bertrand is British. Rather, one is merely using it.

My main point in this talk is that the relevant sense of ‘use’ for the thesis that use determines meaning can’t be either of those! Mere use is just the mere making of noise, it determines pronunciation and spelling, but not
meaning. On the other hand, it can’t be use with meaning either. This for
the very simple reason that such use already presupposes meaningfulness. I
will then argue that there is no theory-neutral characterization of the rele-
vant third notion of ‘use’. Instead, you get Behaviorist, Expressive, Gricean,
Speech Act etc. views, each with their distinct sets of commitments. For
example, on the Expressive view this is understood as mere use while being
in some particular non-audience-directed mental state like belief (Lewis
1975). In contrast, on the Gricean view, it is understood as mere use while
having an audience-directed communicative intention (Keiser 2020). I will
end by arguing that the Expressive view has distinctive advantages over all
the other views.

References


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Seeing with Color: Insights from Psychophysics

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Most contemporary philosophy of color strives to be empirically-informed. A particularly fruitful way of doing empirically-informed philosophy of color is to start with the question of the function or “aim” of color vision, since this is a question that many empirical sciences directly or indirectly investigate. My goal here is to offer a systematic treatment of a particular type of empirical evidence: psychophysical evidence.

I start by differentiating between two competing conceptions of the normative function of color vision: (i) the function of color vision is to track and register stable chromatic properties of visual scenes (Seeing Color) and (ii) the function of color vision is to aid perception and action in a more general way (Seeing with Color). I then argue from the premise that the latter conception better accommodates and explains the available psychophysical evidence to the conclusion that this is the conception that genuinely empirically-informed philosophers of color should adopt.

Psychophysics of color is the study of how changes in stimulus properties affect subjects’ chromatic experiences. I focus on two kinds of systematic perceptual phenomena investigated by psychophysics: color constancy and color induction. ‘Color constancy’ refers to the perceived stability of the color of a target under different kinds of illuminants. Many proponents of Seeing Color take color constancy to reveal that the goal of the color visual system at the computational level is to solve for the surface spectral reflectances of visual objects (e.g., Hilbert 1992, Tye 2000). However, the fact that human color constancy is only approximate (see e.g., Foster 2011) has led other philosophers to argue that the data supports something closer to Seeing with Color instead (e.g., Thompson 1995, Chirimuuta 2015). In ‘color induction,’ on the other hand, a surround induces a shift in the perceived color of a target. Induction effects are systematic and widespread and show that color experiences do not neatly correspond to the physical characteristics of the target stimuli. This puts pressure on the idea that the function of color vision is to recover reflectances. In addition, color induction is often useful to the perceiver (e.g., if a ripe apple looks redder against green foliage, this makes it more conspicuous), which suggests that it might be related to the
overall function of color vision. I argue that whereas Seeing Color can only accommodate constancy, Seeing with Color can accommodate and explain both color constancy and color induction.

I then consider three responses on behalf of Seeing Color: (i) that color induction effects are instances of simple color visual system failure, (ii) that color induction effects reflect computational shortcuts in reflectance recovery, and (iii) that Seeing with Color is at odds with common sense, and should therefore be rejected. I argue that (i) is empirically unmotivated, that (ii) is dangerously ad hoc, and that neither (i) nor (ii) can account for the apparent usefulness of color induction effects. The third response, I suggest, is simply not compatible with a genuinely empirically-informed approach.

References


Complex demonstratives (i.e., expressions combining a bare demonstrative “this” or “that” with a noun phrase; e.g. “this man”, “that black dog”) are widely discussed by theoreticians of language for at least two reasons. One problem is a general question how a demonstrative secures its semantic value in a context; in particular, is the value determined by the speaker’s intention or some external circumstances of the utterance? (E.g., Gauker 2008, King 2014, Reimer 1991, Speaks 2016). The second question about complex demonstratives concerns their logical form: are they genuinely referential expressions or rather quantificational ones, or neither? (E.g., Braun 2008, King 2001, Lepore and Ludwig 2000). We may call the first problem the foundational issue and the second one the logical issue about complex demonstratives.

In my talk, I want to approach the semantics of complex demonstratives from a perspective taking up both the foundational and the logical issue at the same time and by trying to answer them in a theoretically uniform way. Considerations about these two issues are usually conducted separately, in different theoretical frameworks. Non-surprisingly, the foundational issue is a genuine problem of philosophy — a part of the general discussion about the nature of reference — while the logical issue lies at the intersection of philosophy of language and linguistics, and possible solutions seem to be independent. However, this separating trend is, in my opinion, misguided. Firstly, a comprehensive semantic theory of complex demonstratives should answer both issues since they are both semantic, i.e., related to a widely construed meaning of complex demonstratives. Secondly, as I argue in my presentation, an adequate account of how the value of a demonstrative is secured can provide hints or even solutions to several difficulties which arise for a referential treatment of the complex demonstratives logical form.

I advocate for a theory of complex demonstratives (henceforth, CDs) which includes the following theses (roughly stated):

(1) Hybrid account of reference: the referent of an expression is determined by various factors, including inter alia demonstration, perceptual or conversational salience (cf. Lewis 1979), some sorts of causal connections...
Towards a Semantic Theory of Complex Demonstratives

(Devitt 1981, 2004), or a description contained in the expression (cf. Strawson 1950, Sainsbury 2004). These factors can be viewed as different “accessibility criteria” (in terms of Gauker 2008) and the referent of an expression is the object that “best and adequately” satisfies the criteria relevant for a given context; in short, we have different modes of reference and we can generally distinguish between a descriptive and contextual mode (or mixed).

(2) CDs are referential expressions; yet, they are not “directly” referential (contra Braun 2008) since they contribute not only their referent to the proposition expressed, but also their contents which depend on the actual mode of reference.

Based on the presented claims, I argue that we are able to explain a full range of the so-called “non-deictic” uses of CDs, more generally, the ones which do not conform to the referential treatment at first glimpse. These include: discourse reference and anaphora (see Predelli 2001), “no-speaker-reference” uses (King 2001), “quantifying in” (King 2001, Novak 2014), and finally various data concerning scope interpretations. Non-deictic uses basically employ a purely descriptive mode of reference, while deictic uses employ a mixed mode. When the mode of reference is purely descriptive (i.e., the referent is “one or the other object” that satisfies the noun phrase), a complex demonstrative functions like a definite description. It has a consequence that, for example, a narrow-scope reading of a CD is possible when the CD is embedded in a modal or counterfactual environment. On the other hand, when the mode of reference is mixed on a deictic use, it means that some features of the present context must have (partially) determined the referent (e.g., the object has been pointed out by a finger) and so it is an object belonging to the actual world, i.e., world of that context. This explains why such uses generally give rise to interpretations equivalent to wide-scope readings of CDs, in line with the Direct Reference Theory of CDs.

References


Almost everyone is familiar with the famous basketball player, Michael Jordan. Comparatively, very few people are familiar with the other Michael Jordan, the neighbor of mine who has never held a basketball. The fact that these two men share the same name, “Michael Jordan”, raises questions about which of the two is referred to by particular uses of that name, and what criteria determine the reference of such uses.

Some approaches to this problem appeal in this regard to the notion of salience. For example, Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998) propose, roughly, that the reference of a particular use of the name “Michael Jordan” is the object of the most salient “dubbing in force” concerning the name “Michael Jordan” in the context of that use.

But the notion of salience of the bearers of shared names can be appealed to also by those who do not see a semantic role for it. For example, John Perry (1997) suggests that with regards to shared names, there is a pragmatic role for the context to play which comes down to allowing the interpreter to figure out which meaning of the ambiguous name is being used (i.e. which bearer of the name is being referred to by the speaker).

Regardless of what one thinks about the exact role the notion of salience is supposed to play, it calls for being explicated in more detail.

Generally speaking, the full account of salience would have to include both the intralexical effects (i.e. the effects of salience-raising stemming from the other words used in a sentence; e.g. in the sentence “Michael Jordan is the greatest basketball player in history.” the name clearly refers to the athlete simply by virtue of the predicate used) and the non-intralexical ones. The aim of my paper is to try to explicate the non-intralexical aspect.

In my talk, I shall provide a relatively simple algorithm aimed at making the correct predictions concerning the salience of different bearers of a name in different lexically unbiased contexts.

The algorithm distinguishes three kinds of different conversational backgrounds and makes them into a hierarchy: one for the current conversation, one for the previous conversations involving the same participants, and one general background consisting of all conversations ever had.
The general idea behind the model is that the salient bearer of the name is the one that was most often referred to with the prior uses of the name. Once this bare idea is refined by the appeal to the mentioned hierarchy of conversational backgrounds, the model is able to provide decent salience-related predictions for a reasonable class of cases.

References


The sentence ‘I am not here now’ on answering machines seems to be true. Yet Kaplan’s theory of indexicals (Kaplan, 1989) predicts that every expression of ‘I am not here now’ is universally false. According to Kaplan’s semantics, ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’ always refer to the speaker, the location of utterance, and the time of utterance, respectively. Also, always at the time of utterance, the speaker is at the location of utterance, and therefore ‘I am here now’ is universally true, and the negation is universally false. Several philosophers introduced a number of solutions to this problem.

Sidelle (1991) and subsequently, Cohen (2013) propose a view in which indexical reference depends on the context of hearing/reading (Cohen calls this context “the context of tokening”). They claim if the sentence ‘I am not here’ is evaluated in the context of tokening, it will be true because ‘now’ refers to the time of playback, not the time of recording. I will show that this account is in trouble in some ways: I will provide two counterexamples to this solution and argue that Cohen’s response to the problems is ad-hoc.

Corazza, Fish, and Gorvett (2002) provide a conventionalist response to the answering machine puzzle. They argue that the theory of reference of indexicals cannot predict whether the content of indexical-containing utterances is determined by the context of production or the context of tokening, without regarding language users’ conventions. The value of the parameters of the context, which specifies the referents of indexical expressions, is determined by the socio-linguistic conventions. By providing a scenario, I will argue that this account cannot give a convincing explanation for this scenario.

Michaelson (2014) provides a shifty character (hereafter SC) view in which this is the context-type that determines the reference-fixing rules of indexicals. The context-type is dependent on the communicative channel as a medium through which language users communicate. So, in the context-type of the answering machine media, the referent of ‘I’ is the device owner, the referent of ‘here’ is the place of playback, and the referent of the ‘now’ is the time of playback. I will show that this view suffers from a serious counterexample, which is not explained by the SC account.
I will try to show that (i) accounts above face the objections, which supported by some strong linguistic intuitions and, (ii) none of the accounts above is preferable to Kaplan’s theory. Finally, I will defend a pragmatic solution that Åkerman (2017) puts forward and enrich this solution by using a new communication framework. By appealing to the distinction between linguistic communication and conversational understanding, I will argue that while the sentence ‘I am not here now’ is semantically false, and also it linguistically communicates something false through the playback utterance, the audience understands (grasps) that at the time of playback, the speaker is not at the location of the playback. In other words, linguistic communication through the answering device fails, whereas the understanding succeeds.

References


The field of ‘information structure’ (or ‘thematic-rhematic structure’ in the Polish tradition) studies how different meanings emerge from the use of different placements of sentence stress, as in English (1), different word orders, as in Polish (2), various constructions, as in English (3), and certain particles, such as Polish to in (4):

(1) JohnNlikes BROCCOLI/John LIKES broccoli/JOHN likes broccoli.
(2) Teresa śpiewa./Śpiewa Teresa. (‘THERESA IS SINGING’)
(3) Zucchini,my sister cooks well./What my sister cooks well is zucchini.
(4) W czwartki to Janek gra w brydża. (‘ON THURSDAYS, WHAT JANEK DOES IS PLAY BRIDGE.’)

What do these quite heterogenous linguistic devices all have in common? In most approaches, they are assumed to partition utterances into (at least) two different varieties of content.

These are often described, for instance, as given/old information vs. new information (e.g. in Prince’s 1981 early typology). Quite a number of formal categories have been proposed (e.g. TOPIC vs. COMMENT, THEME vs. RHEME, FOCUS vs. BACKGROUND, etc.) to account for how this partition is encoded by speakers and decoded by hearers. However, the resulting ‘terminological profusion and confusion, and underlying conceptual vagueness’ (Levinson 1983) has been infamous for decades and still shows little sign of convergence (Gundel Fretheim 2009).

Some recent work in information structure (e.g. Matić Wedgwood 2013, Ozerov 2018) offers a possible explanation for this: that information-structural distinction are not actually encoded, but instead arise dynamically and through inference, during the course of utterance interpretation. This work directly challenges the linguistic and psychological reality of such putatively universal information-structural categories as TOPIC and FOCUS.

In this presentation, I show how information-structural effects such as those in (1)-(4) can be accounted for in a processing model of this sort, couched in Sperber Wilson’s (1986/1995) relevance theory. Relevance theory recognizes utterance interpretation as a dynamic processes guided by the
search for relevance, consisting of several “mutually parallel” subprocesses that influence one another: not only decoding of propositional content, but also context selection and derivation of cognitive effects. Utterance elements may contribute to varying degrees to these subprocesses.

On this approach, the fundamental intuition of information structure – that utterances convey different varieties of content (given/old information vs. new information) – is explained not in terms of encoded categories, but rather in terms of how utterance elements procedurally contribute to these mutually parallel subprocesses of interpretation. More “TOPIC-like” / “THEME-like” elements contribute more significantly to context selection, whereas more “FOCUS-like” / “RHEME-like” elements contribute more to the derivation of cognitive effects. Naturally, the distinction is not always clear-cut.

References


Pointing is widely recognised as a key steppingstone in the acquisition of a language. A vast number of experiments support the claim that, from the point of view of its pragmatics, the complexities of infants’ pointing anticipate in important ways those of later emerging forms of linguistic communication. A pointing gesture can be used to request as well as to inform, and it may refer to, for instance, an event, an object, or the property of an object. Infants communicate effectively by means of pointing in a wide variety of situations, and understand when others do so, too (see, e.g., Tomasello 2008, 2019).

Despite its central importance and the vast amount of attention it has received, several aspects of infants’ pointing remain opaque. A conception of common ground in terms of mutual knowledge is positively discouraged by the available empirical evidence, and alternative conceptions which have been proposed in the literature are either vague or seriously problematic (see, e.g., Bohn Köymen 2018). Correlatively, beyond assuming that infants’ pointing is premised on the recognition of Gricean communicative intentions and postulating that infants engage in ‘socially recursive’ inferences of an indefinite number of steps, there is no clear picture of the kind of pragmatic reasoning which infants need to go through for communicating as they do.

Through a close reading of the key experiments on informative and requestive pointing, I will detail an account of infants’ pointing aimed at filling these theoretical lacunae. My proposal is to conceptualise pointing as a device for sharing a commitment to attend to an object or event (Scarafone Michael 2022). Following Bart Geurts (2019), I propose to conceptualise common ground not as any kind of psychological construct, but rather as a normative condition, consisting in a set of shared commitments. Within this framework, it is then possible to individuate a stable communicative function of pointing gestures independent of their varying cognitive and motivational underpinnings, and it is also possible to explain, in a formally neat way, how successfully addressed pointing gestures both update and rely
upon the common ground. From a cognitive point of view, I will argue, an important representational proxy for assumptions in the common ground is infants’ recognition of the adult’s role within the context of the interaction.

I will show how this commitment-based account of infants’ pointing can systematise in an illuminating way the key experimental findings. A further upshot of my argument will be that, on the commitment-based construal, the recognition of communicative intentions becomes explanatorily dispensable, and there is no obvious way of demonstrating experimentally that infants’ communication is, in this sense, Gricean (Scarafone 2022).

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How thought experiments are constructed? In the past fifteen years several proposals were formulated and discussed (see e.g. Williamson 2007; Ichikawa Jarvis 2009; Malmgren 2011; Grundman and Horvath 2014; Saint-Germier 2021). Much of this literature is focused on the problem of deviant realizations, according to which many attempts to reconstruct the logical structure of the method of cases do not exclude far-fetched interpretations of thought experiment’s descriptions that are inconsistent with the expected conclusions of these experiments. For example, it is argued that some of mentioned accounts of the logical structure of the method of cases leave the possibility of interpreting Gettier cases in such a way that the protagonist turns out either to have knowledge or to not have justified true belief.

In the talk I will argue that the investigation of thought experiments consists of two stages. In the first stage, it is determined whether a particular scrutinized case is a deviant or a genuine realization of a thought experiment. I will call this investigation stage of thought experiments the interpretative procedure. In the second stage, which I will call the discriminating procedure, a verdict is reached on whether the thing which is at issue (e.g., a protagonist’s knowledge) appears within the scrutinized case (e.g., a Gettier case). As I will show, the problem of deviant realizations can be solved by showing that in the interpretative procedure we establish the set of the genuine realizations of the description of a certain thought experiment thanks to the semantic intuition, and the contextual information about the meaning of a thought experiment’s substantial terms (e.g. justification, belief, inference for epistemological thought experiments).

The structure of my talk will be as follows: firstly, I will introduce the problem of deviant realizations, and I will discuss both Williamson’s solution to this problem and its criticism. I will show that the verdict on whether the thing that is at issue appears in the particular state of affairs is preceded by the overlooked interpretative procedure, in which we are distinguishing deviant from genuine realizations of the given thought experiment. Subsequently, I will show that the faculty which enables us
to employ the interpretative procedure is semantic intuition. In order to
describe how semantic intuition fulfills its role, I will discuss the problem
of its context-sensitivity regarding the interpretative procedure. In more
detail, I will argue that this issue can be explained if we combine the frame-
work of the so-called default interpretation regarding the context-sensitivity
of semantic intuition with the framework of semantic approaches to the
context-sensitivity of quantifier phrases. I will conclude with some remarks
concerning the significance of the results for the role of expertise in thought
experiments’ investigation.

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Radical contextualism (RC) is a prominent view in philosophy of language, whose root can at least be traced back to Wittgenstein. And it flowers in various forms in the caring hands of prominent philosophers such as, amongst others, Searle (1978, 1980), Travis (1996), and Recanati (2004, 2010) in modern days. Very roughly, RC maintains the meanings of the sentences are determined in the contexts of utterances. In spite of its honorable pedigree, RC has recently been met with lots of challenges; we cannot go into all of them. This paper will focus on one very prominent challenge issued by the so called ‘semantic minimalists’ such as Cappelen Lepore (2005) and Borg (2004). Borg (2004) bolsters what she calls “Minimal Semantics” (MS), which aims to delimit the boundary of semantic theorizing. Very roughly, it endorses the view that formal semantics (the view that meanings of sentences are “completely independent of considerations of the context in which... sentences might be uttered” (p. 19) remains unscathed despite “challenges stemming from putative points of pragmatic intrusion into semantic content” (p.259). As I see it, what underlies Borg’s MS is what Cappelen Lepore (2005, chapter 10) call ‘Semantic Minimalism’ (SM), the view that the semantic content or meaning of a sentence S is “the content that all utterances of S have no matter how different their contexts of utterances are”. Apparently, if SM is true, then RC is immediately falsified.

In my paper, I’ll defend RC against SM. This is mainly because SM admits of exceptions, by Cappelen Lepore’s own lights, for utterances that contain what Cappelen Lepore call ‘genuinely context-sensitive words’ such as ‘I’, ‘this’ or ‘that’. However, I will argue that once the door of exceptions is open, this will actually go all the way to RC. This is mainly because these so-called ‘genuinely context-sensitive words’ are context-sensitive for a reason. And the reason, as I will argue, is that they express ‘incomplete meanings’ to be completed by contextual factors. If so, and if all the other words actually express the same sort of incomplete meanings too, with their complete meanings to be completed by contextual factors (which I will argue is indeed the case), then there’s no reason for Cappelen Lepore to deny that the complete semantic meanings of utterances that do not contain those
purported ‘genuinely context-sensitive words’ have to be determined in their utterance contexts by various contextual factors too. If this is right, RC can thus be vindicated.
It’s often said that beliefs can be true or false, but that desires are satisfied or frustrated. Many philosophers argue that this isn’t cause to see a big difference between beliefs and desires, because there’s a common notion of semantic satisfaction underlying this practice; the satisfaction conditions of a belief that P is just that P obtains. Likewise, it’s said, the satisfaction conditions of a desire that P is satisfied if P obtains. However, Stampe [1986] and Lycan [2012] argue that this notion of semantic satisfaction fail to capture what we tend to mean when we say that a desire has been fulfilled. As Lycan puts it, a desire is not satisfied until it’s content becomes true. As Stampe puts it, the present tense truth of the desire’s content is necessary to the satisfaction of the desire. To put the matter more perspicuously, suppose I want to eat a piece of cake for desert tonight. And suppose it’s true that I will do it; I’ve obtained the cake, arranged to eat it, and nothing stands in the way of the execution of my desire. But it’s true that I will eat the cake, and yet that doesn’t satisfy my desire. No, my desire is satisfied when I eat the cake. The aim of my talk is to investigate this insight. I will argue that insight into desire’s satisfaction conditions actually require of desire contents that they be temporally neutral. This is in contrast to belief contents which are very often said to be temporally specific. This idea is easy enough to accommodate. However, Stampe’s Insight faces a prima facie challenge from desire ascriptions with temporal adjuncts, like “Esther wants to go to the park this afternoon”. The two most obvious roles for this temporal adjunct is for it to specify a time absolutely, or relationally. If it contributes a time to the desire content absolutely, this would run afoul of Stampe’s Insight. If it contributes a time to the desire content relationally, the resulting content will still be temporally neutral. But as I will show, the consequences run roughshod over our common desire ascription practices. There is a third option that I will propose, which is where the temporal adjuncts in desire ascriptions do not actually specify a contribution to the attitude content at all – either absolutely or relationally. Instead, they propose an interval at which the (temporally neutral) content is to to be evaluated for satisfaction. Not only does this proposal respect Stampe’s Insight, I show how
this proposal can be fairly easily accommodated in the semantics of desire
ascriptions, and defend some empirical consequences of the proposal.

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I investigate: (1) to what extent do folk ascriptions of lying differ between casual and courtroom contexts? (2) to what extent does motive (reason) to lie influence ascriptions of trust, mental states, and lying judgments? (3) to what extent are lying judgments consistent with previous ascriptions of communicated content? Following the Supreme Court’s Bronston judgment, I expect: (1) averaged lying judgments to be similar in casual and courtroom contexts; (2) motive to lie to influence levels of trust, mental states ascriptions, and patterns of lying judgments; (3) retrospective judgments of lying, after being presented with the state of the world, to be inconsistent with previous judgments of communicated content: participants hold the protagonist responsible for content she did not communicate. I performed a survey experiment on the Qualtrics platform. Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 630). I employed standard Likert scales and forced-choice questions. I found that: (1) average lying judgments are similar in casual and courtroom contexts; (2) motive to lie decreases trust ascription and increases lying judgment; (3) judgments of lying are inconsistent with previous judgments of communicated content: participants hold the protagonist responsible for content they did not communicate (effect size of the difference d = .69). Perjury ascriptions are inconsistent. The Supreme Court’s worries expressed in the Bronston judgment are well founded.
Since the publication of Saul Kripke’s “Naming and Necessity” (1980) and especially his devastating critique of descriptivist views (e.g. John Searle’s and, more arguably, Gottlob Frege’s) on the reference of proper names, a discussion concerning the nature of reference of proper names has never quietened. A variety of views, concerning the nature of proper names has emerged since then, of which some of the most influential are predicativism, rigid-descriptivism and direct reference theories. However, one possibility, although proposed by several authors (e.g. Dąmbska (1949), Ackermann (1989), Recanati (1993)), has never gained deserved attention – namely, that proper names can be treated as indexicals.

In my talk, I would like to argue for three claims:

(1) Viewing proper names as indexicals is a coherent way of approaching a variety of traditional phenomena concerning proper names, especially the problem of proper names with several bearers (as “Michael”, a name both for Michael Jackson and Michael Caine) and its modal rigidity (observed by Kripke (1980); in case of indexicals it has been analyzed by Kaplan in his “Demonstratives” (1989a)).

(2) The best way of approaching phenomena concerning proper names as indexicals is through an analysis of indexicals known as hybrid names approach (proposed by Künne (1992) and further analyzed by Predelli (2006)). I will provide an analysis of proper names as hybrid names, and show two possible ways of treating them: (a) as “true indexicals” associated with a character, which picks a referent of a proper name in a given context independently of speaker’s intentions (through a process of “dubbing” as described by Perry and Korta (2011)) and (b) as demonstratives, which content is dependent on speaker’s referential intentions (as portrayed e.g. by Kaplan (1989b)).

(3) Hybrid names approach to proper names allow us a unified and natural treatment of puzzling cases concerning proper names, especially in intensional contexts – Frege’s (1892) Puzzle and Kripke’s (1979) Puzzle, by modifying solution proposed by Textor (2015) and Kaplan (1990).
I will also argue, that if such an analysis is possible, it should be counted as evidence in favor of indexical view on names – since it accommodates and uniquely treats cases of Frege’s and Kripke’s Puzzles arising in the context of proper names and indexicals. Through showing this three claims, I hope to show that indexical analysis of proper names is fruitful and should be treated as a major contender among other popular views on proper name reference.

References

Wilfrid Sellars introduced the notion of material principles of inference relying on Carnap’s distinction between Logically valid and Physically valid inferences:

“If we suppose ‘(x) φ x implies ψ x’ to state a law of nature,
I. (x) φx ⊃ ψx, but φa, therefore ψ a would be an L-valid inference.
II. φa, therefore ψa would be a P-valid inference.” (“Inference and Meaning”, Mind 1953, 319)

Sellars claims that “instead of merely being abridged edition of a formally valid argument, ‘It is raining, therefore the streets will be wet’ might well be as it stands a valid argument, though warranted by a material principle of inference.” (Ibid. 313)

Robert Brandom, following Sellars, takes the inference from ‘It is raining’ to ‘The streets will be wet,’ as a materially good inference — i.e. an inference that is good “because of the content of its nonlogical vocabulary.” (Articulating Reasons, 2000, 85) On the other hand, “if the form-defining fixed vocabulary is logical vocabulary,” then such inferences “are good in virtue of their logical form.” (Ibid. 85, 86) Brandom argues that logically good (valid) inferences are definable in terms of materially good (valid) ones.

In the paper I argue that the basic kind of validity is not material, but is a kind of validity which I propose to call semiotic validity. This notion I derive from C.S. Peirce’s view on the semiotic relationship between premises and the conclusion of an inference. C.S. Peirce attempted to relate the three kinds of inference – deduction, abduction and induction to the three kinds of sign – index, icon and symbol. Briefly: an index is a sign which signifies due to its existential connection with its referent, an icon is a sign which signifies due to its structural resemblance with its referent, and a symbol is a sign which denotes due to some convention.

In the paper I apply Peirce’s division of signs to Aristotle’s. Aristotle says that “a sign may be taken in three ways, corresponding to the position of the middle term in the figures,” that is, a sign “may be taken as in the first figure or the second or the third.” (Prior Analytics, II, 27)
I argue that the middle term of an abduction is an icon, the middle term of an induction is a symbol and most importantly for the question about the grounds of logical validity, I argue that the middle term of a deduction is an index.

Given this, I conclude that logical (i.e. deductive) validity of the inference \(\forall x \phi x \supset \psi x\), but \(\phi a\), therefore \(\psi a\)” does not rest on its material validity, but is based on the fact that ‘\(\phi\)’ is an index of ‘\(\psi\)’, that is: its logical validity is grounded on its semiotic validity.
A growing number of authors suggest that thoughts expressed in ordinary ‘I’/‘you’-exchanges can be the same in a context while holding on to Frege’s Criterion for the distinctness of thought. In this paper, I argue that this compatibility claim can only be sustained at the price of relativising the result of Frege’s Criterion to contexts in ways that render it unprincipled or idle for the individuation of thought. This is so in spite of the fact that the application of Frege’s Criterion is uncontroversially relativised to subjects in a context or time. The result bears on any approach committed to interpersonal shareability of first person thought and, plausibly, on any account willing to contextualise the notion of ‘same thought’ as delivered by Frege’s Criterion. However, it does not in and of itself threaten the individuation of thought at the level of cognitive significance.
Belief ascriptions and the principle of harmony

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Belief ascriptions and the principle of harmony

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Since the seminal work of Gottlob Frege, it is generally assumed that belief-ascribing sentences always specify the content of the ascribed belief (that is, the proposition the believer is said to believe), and that this content is the proposition which their embedded sentence would express, were it uttered in isolation. In other words, during the last one hundred years, almost all the proposed theories of the semantics of belief ascriptions have been guided, even dominated, by the following general assumption about what is necessary for the truth of a belief-ascribing sentence:

(HARMONY): For any context c, ‘a believes that S’ is true relative to c only if a believes the proposition which ‘S’ would express, were it uttered in isolation in the same surroundings of c.

I shall do two things in this paper.

First, I shall I provide various arguments against the principle of (HARMONY). Roughly speaking, these arguments fall into two categories. On the one hand, I shall cite uses of belief-ascribing sentences which harmony theorists apparently cannot handle without getting into difficulty with the concept of singular thought: either they will deny the existence of such uses or their significance for semantic theorizing, or they will find themselves denying platitudes about singular thoughts, or mischaracterizing as having certain singular thoughts people who clearly do not have those thoughts. On the other hand, I shall cite uses of belief-ascribing sentences which harmony theorists apparently cannot handle without getting into difficulty with the attributive/referential distinction: either they will deny the existence of such uses or their significance for semantic theorizing, or they will find themselves mischaracterizing as referential certain uses of definite descriptions which are clearly attributive.

Second, I shall propose an alternative to the principle of (HARMONY) and consider how it is capable of accommodating the uses of belief-ascribing sentences that trouble the harmony theorist. I would like to highlight that, just like (HARMONY), the alternative I shall propose merely states a nec-
essary condition for the truth of a belief-ascribing sentence, so it cannot be taken to be a complete theory of the semantics of belief-ascribing sentences. Indeed, a complete theory of the semantics of belief ascriptions must state a necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of a belief-ascribing sentence in a context. I have my own view about what the sufficient condition should be, but a proper presentation of my account would outrun a feasible number of minutes and is necessarily beyond the scope of this paper. My goal here is something much more modest than providing a complete theory of the semantics of belief ascriptions, namely, to refute (HARMONY) and to replace this thesis about what is necessary for the truth of a belief-ascribing sentence with another that is capable of handling a wider range of data.
Standard contextualist solutions to the sceptical paradoxes are advertised as providing a way to retain epistemic closure while avoiding both the excessive epistemic ‘modesty’ of radical scepticism and the epistemic ‘immodesty’ of Moorean dogmatism. However, it is dubious that contextualist approaches succeed in reconciling epistemic closure with proper epistemic modesty, for their insistence that all epistemic properties denoted by ‘knows’ are closed under deduction commits them to the claim that contexts in which ordinary propositions can be known to be true are also contexts in which suitably related sceptical hypotheses can be known to be false. So Jonathan Schaffer (2004; 2005) has argued that a satisfactory treatment of the sceptical paradoxes can be achieved only by replacing standard versions of epistemic contextualism with the (successor) contrastivist view that knowledge ascriptions are context sensitive because knowledge is a three-place relation between an agent, a proposition and a contrast – a view that comes with its own contrastive closure principles (Schaffer 2007). In this paper I defend these principles against the charge, made by Kelp (2011) and Hughes (2013), that they licence the very step from modest knowledge of ordinary propositions to immodest knowledge of the negation of sceptical hypotheses that they were intended to forestall (the ‘comparativist’ semantics of knowledge ascriptions proposed by Schaffer Szabo 2014 may help to defend epistemic contextualism broadly construed against charges of semantic implausibility, but has no real bearing on the issue at hand). In response, I develop a suggestion by Schaffer (reported in Kelp 2011), arguing that the charge is misplaced because it arises from ignoring the fact that it is not only when the relevant contrast is left implicit, but also when it is explicitly stated, that context contributes to determine the set of alternatives that must be ruled out by an agent’s evidence for the agent to know that things are one way rather than another. This is because, contrary to what Schaffer himself sometimes seems to suggest, in most cases the range of live options that must be eliminated by an agent’s evidence for the agent to possess knowledge is expressed by an explicit ‘rather-than’-clause only in conjunction with the tacit presuppositions that shape the context of the relevant knowledge
ascription. So it cannot simply be assumed, as Schaffer’s critics typically do when constructing their purported counterexamples to the claim that contrastive closure avoids epistemic immodesty, that such a range is not going to incorporate, as a result of the deductive step(s) exploited in the relevant cases, previously tacit presuppositions that are not ruled out by the agent’s evidence. My conclusion is then that the case against Schaffer’s contrastive account of epistemic closure is far from compelling.

References


Any formal account of evaluating probabilities of conditional sentences has (at least) two important problems to solve:

1. Accounting for Lewis’ triviality arguments, concerning the PC=CP thesis (i.e. The probability of the conditional is conditional probability).

2. Understanding and incorporating different interpretations of the conditional into the formal model.

In our account, the intuitive illustration of the conditional is given in terms of a game. Its rules depend on the interpretation of the conditional (local versus global; deep versus shallow). Formally it is represented as a Markov chain, which gives a very simple method of evaluating the probabilities as well as an intuitive graphical illustration (“interface”).

We define a formal model for evaluating probabilities of conditionals in terms of Markov chains (which generate appropriate probability spaces). This allows us to describe several possible interpretations of the conditional (the global and the local interpretation, the deep and the shallow and generalizations of them) and to formalize some intuitively valid but formally incorrect considerations concerning the probabilities of conditionals under these interpretations. The description given in terms of stochastic processes provides a satisfactory answer to Lewis arguments, and defends important intuitions which connect the notion of probability of a conditional with the standard notion of conditional probability.

In the talk we focus on the problem of the probabilities of conditionals; we do not discuss questions concerning logical and metalogical issues such as setting up an axiomatic framework, inference rules, defining semantics, proving completeness, soundness etc. Our theory is motivated by the possible-worlds approach (the direct formal inspiration is the Stalnaker Bernoulli developed by van Fraassen and Kaufmann); however, our model is generally more flexible. It is general enough to present a method for computing probabilities of right-nested conditionals. The graph model makes it possible to account in a unified way for both shallow and deep interpretations of right-nested conditionals (the former being typical of Stalnaker Bernoulli...
spaces, the latter of McGee’s and Kaufmann’s causal Stalnaker Bernoulli models). In particular, we discuss the status of the Import-Export Principle and PCCP. The results also illustrate the general problem of finding formal explications of philosophically important notions and applying mathematical methods in analyzing philosophical issues. As a “byproduct” it contributes to the problem of mathematical explanations. Standard examples come from natural science – but here a linguistic (and philosophical) problem is offered a mathematical explanation.
This paper is an attempt to read Kenneth Taylor’s posthumously published ‘Referring to the World’ (2021) from a fully internalist, conceptualist position in semantics.

Taylor’s key distinction in the book is one between objectual and objective representations. Whereas fully objective representations stand for real existents and are semantically answerable to the world, merely objectual representations are those that are “fit” for referring, although they perhaps do not yet do so. This fitness is defined, according to Taylor, in ‘syntactic’ (in the sense of logical syntax) terms. As the first move in the paper, objectuality is accepted, including its syntactic definition (although some doubts are raised whether Taylor is right in claiming that ‘referential fitness accrues only to a system of representations’), but objectivity, which construes reference as a real relation in nature, is rejected. It is claimed that nobody has been able to give a convincing account of reference as a real relation (some views, not discussed by Taylor, are adduced, especially Michael Devitt’s). A consequence of Taylor’s view of objectivity is that there can be incomplete propositions. It is argued, to the contrary, that propositions construed as mental entities are never incomplete. At the mental level, what Taylor construes as incomplete propositions are fully-fledged propositions (i.e. at the level of mental functioning, there is no difference between an “incomplete proposition” and a complete one). This is reinforced by the claim that cognitive science, as the theory of mental structure and mental processing, has no place for “incomplete contents” – and it is claimed that Taylor’s, and any other, theory of reference should find a natural home within cognitive science. This line of argument is buttressed by a thought experiment.

Next, attention is directed at Taylor’s construal of names. According to Taylor, names are defined (syntactically again) as devices of explicit coreference, and therein lies the solution to Frege’s puzzle. This is accepted, as are Taylor’s arguments against the indexical and predicative views of names. The potential homonymy view of names is endorsed.
In the final part of the paper, a different account of reference is proposed. It is claimed, first, that reference is not a real relation, but a conceptualization of a relation/connection between a term and an entity, a conceptualization which competent speakers of a language share. Reference as a stable, extra-mental, scientifically studiable relation doesn’t exist. Second, it is claimed that, in the sense in which it does exist as a phenomenon outside the mind, reference is a social phenomenon which crucially involves the Theory of Mind (ToM) faculty. Reference in the social sense is the process of systematic calling attention to certain entities, be they in the immediate environment or not. As such it involves ToM at the levels of learning, using and dubbing. It is concluded that ToM is the blind spot of existing theories of reference (including Taylor’s).
Many natural language expressions, including predicates of taste ("tasty", "disgusting"), aesthetic adjectives ("beautiful", "ugly"), moral terms ("good", "bad", "ought to"), epistemic modals ("must", "might") etc. are perspectival, in the sense that they require a perspective to be supplied for their semantic interpretation. Relativism, one of the major views on the market (Kölbel 2004, 2009; Lasersohn 2005, 2016; MacFarlane 2014 etc.), captures their perspectivality by introducing parameters for perspectives in the “circumstances of evaluation” (Kaplan (1989)) with respect to which utterances of sentences containing such terms are evaluated for truth.

In this talk, I want to tackle the issue of what is the best way to handle “perspective-shifting” in a relativist framework. Shifting is illustrated by several linguistic/interpretative phenomena. Thus, although most of the time perspectival expressions are used with the speaker’s perspective as the default, sentences like

(1) Licorice is tasty,

can be interpreted from someone else’s point of view (this is what Lasersohn (2005) calls “exocentric uses”, as opposed to “autocentric” ones). Perspectives can also be shifted via explicit “for”-phases, quantifiers or attitude and speech verbs, as the following sentences illustrate:

(2) Licorice is tasty for Anne.
(3) Everyone got something tasty. (Schaffer 2011: 193)
(4) Alicia believes/thinks/etc. that licorice is tasty.
(5) Helen finds licorice tasty.
(6) Mary said that licorice is tasty.

The combination of autocentric and exocentric uses of perspectival expressions in a sentence gives rise to a less-discussed phenomenon: perspectival plurality (Kneer 2015, Kneer et al. 2017) – basically, the existence of readings of such sentences in which appeal to two different perspectives is needed. Thus,

(7) At Halloween, Johnny played a silly prank and had a lot of tasty licorice
has a reading according to which, while the licorice was tasty for Johnny, the prank was silly for the speaker or a third party. Perspectival plurality is also possible with “for”-phrases, quantifiers and attitude verbs – as the following sentences illustrate:

(8) Licorice is tasty for Anne, but not for Bob.
(9) At Halloween, every kid played a silly prank and had a lot of tasty licorice.
(10) The mother snipe thinks the ugliest baby birds are beautiful. Sæbø (2013: 337)

I aim to provide a unified relativistic account of all shifting phenomena. To this end, I explore two possibilities: i) an “intensional” approach, according to which all shifters are treated as intentional operators (a la Lasersohn (2008)); ii) an “extensional” approach according to which all shifters are treated as variadic operators (as in Zeman 2015). Neither of these two accounts, however, has taken perspectival plurality into consideration. Relying on previous work (Zeman 2019), I argue that the best way to account for this phenomenon is by introducing a sequence of parameters for perspectives (this leading to an interestingly different version of relativism which I dub “Multiple Indexing Relativism”). Accordingly, the main challenge to the two accounts of perspective-shifting concerns the effects of having a sequence of parameters instead of a single parameter. The reminder of the paper explores various issues, both formal and philosophical, that arise in this respect: among them, how do the lexical entries of the relevant expressions change, what types of contents we end up postulating, what implications do these new types of contents have for assertion, belief or communication etc.

References


Contextualists present context-shifting experiments, i.e., they describe different conversational contexts in which a given sentence is uttered, in order to argue that context can shape meaning and truth conditions to such a degree that competent speakers would give opposite truth evaluations of the same sentence in different contexts. The initial findings reported by Hansen and Chemla (2013) suggest that laypersons’ semantic judgments are sensitive to context in the same way that is predicted by contextualists. In our study, we focus on context-shifting experiments that involve color ascriptions. The aims of our project are twofold.

The first goal was to conduct a partial replication and methodological extension of Hansen and Chemla’s study and corroborate these authors’ findings using a bigger sample, as well as test the robustness of results in different methodological variants of empirical adaptations of context-shifting experiments. This latter idea was inspired by Ziółkowski (2017), who argued that certain experimental settings (within-subjects) might bring data that is more favorable to contextualism than other settings (between-subjects). The first part of the study investigates four different context-shifting experiments involving color ascriptions (Leaves, Walls, Apples and Kettle) and compares three different experimental settings: within-subjects (with randomized order of context presentation), between-subjects (where participants evaluating different contexts are distinct groups), and “contrastive design” (where both contexts are presented side by side on the same screen). The results are highly consistent across the methodological variants we employed: while they show some of the effects expected by contextualists, it is disputable whether they bring strong support to contextualism with respect to color adjectives. The only exception is the Leaves scenario, where we observed a noticeable impact of context on truth evaluations which fits contextualist predictions.

The second part of the study focuses on the Leaves scenario exclusively and addresses the question of what mechanism is responsible for the truth-
conditional variability of the utterances of the form “the leaves on my tree are green.” Most explanations of this phenomenon focus on the semantics of color adjectives (Szabó 2001; Rothschild and Segal 2009; Kennedy and McNally 2010; Hansen 2011). However, it is not clear if these explanations do justice to the nuances of the empirical data on context-sensitivity of color predications. In contrast to the adjectival explanations, Vicente (2015) has recently proposed that the context-sensitivity of color predications can be explained by invoking the polysemy of the noun (here: “leaves”). In the second part of the study, we present the results of two experiments designed to empirically test this hypothesis: a traditional survey experiment and an exploratory correlational study inspired by the semantic integration paradigm (e.g., Powell et al. 2015). While the results of the former seem to speak against the polysemy hypothesis, the results of the latter suggest that the survey experiment might have failed to adequately test Vicente’s prediction. It seems that the questions whether context-shifting experiments concerning color ascriptions elicit intuitions in line with contextualist predictions and what mechanism is responsible for the dependence of truth evaluations on context are far from being resolved.